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Abstract
Since the mid-1970s, partisan polarization has been increasing in Congress and the Presidency,
and, although most voters lack a stable, consistent ideology, non-ideological forms of partisan
polarization have emerged in the mass public in recent decades. Moreover, ideological polarization
among elites is highly asymmetrical, with increased Republican conservatism accounting for most
of the increased ideological distance between the parties. Here, I develop a racial-threat backlash
theory and argue that increased rates of immigration are associated with increased asymmetrical
ideological polarization among elites and in the mass public. Tests of this theory on voters, the
mass public in the states, state legislators, and Senators provide support for my theory. In addition,
when accounting for the effects of immigration, I do not find support for the alternative explanation
that increased income inequality leads to increased asymmetrical partisan polarization.

Keywords: polarization; partisan polarization; immigration; political parties; ideology; inequality
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Chapter 1: Introduction
It often seems that the only thing modern American partisans can agree on is that the
opposing party, with its bewilderingly misguided opinions and positions, inhabits a social,
cultural, and political space somewhere opposite a yawning, probably unbridgeable divide.
Nonetheless, we tirelessly, and often sanctimoniously, lament the rancor and acrimony
surrounding the so-called red state/blue state divide over deeply held values like abortion and the
definition of marriage, as well as more esoteric, but no less passionately held, opinions about
equality, hard work, and just rewards. However, this consensus collapses when it comes time to
assign blame for internecine partisan warfare, and we dutifully return to our places on either side
of the bright line separating the red and blue Americas. Amid this white noise of division and
dysfunction, it is easy to forget that, within many voters’ living memories, the parties stood on
staid, similarly centrist platforms—so much so that in 1950 the American Political Science
Association issued a special report lamenting that there was too little ideological distance
between the Republican and Democratic parties to offer voters meaningful, easily distinguishable
choices (APSA 1950). In fact, David Mayhew argued in 1974—just as the current trend of
increasing polarization was beginning—that Congress could in theory devolve into an arena for
destructively adversarial, zero-sum partisan combat, but nonetheless insisted:
The general picture of the congressional party system is one of a system in slow
decline—or, to put it another way, a system whose zero-sum edges have been
eroded away by powerful norms of institutional universalism (Mayhew 1974, 104105).
Whether one views the post-war consensus as ideological lethargy or principled
cooperation in pursuit of the greater good, how we went from there to the extreme polarization of
today in a few short decades is an open question. Just as perplexingly, while Lewis et al’s (2018)
DW-NOMINATE data show that partisan polarization in Congress and the Presidency began in
1

the 1970s, the mass public did not begin polarizing until the 1990s. Polarization in the mass
public is so slight that the literature is inconclusive as to whether or not it is appropriate to
describe the mass public as polarized, or whether or not partisan polarization is largely an elite
phenomenon separate from a more politically moderate mass public (Lewis et al. 2018; Fiorina
and Abrams 2008; Pew Survey Center 2015; Barber and McCarty 2013).
Although the reasons we set off on the road to polarization may remain complex and
controversial, the stops we took along the way are, in retrospect, obvious. By the 1980 election,
it was clear that the parties had solidified their opposing stances on salient social issues, for
example women’s rights, and that the racial polarization of the parties was well underway.
Nonetheless, the idea of a polarized country did not enter the mainstream discourse until Pat
Buchanan’s 1992 claim that the United States faced a “culture war,” followed by the Republican
takeover of Congress in 1994 and the emergence of "angry white males" as a media theme and
Republican voting bloc. Then, in 1998, the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal brought bitter interparty
acrimony to the forefront of the news cycle, and added a partisan dimension to the until-then
vague and largely anecdotal perception of a widening “values gap.” By the 2000 presidential
election, the media’s fascination with the “red state/blue state” map of electoral college results,
which showed a conservative South and heartland rallying behind Bush, while the coasts and
industrial Midwest voted Democratic, made for an ever-present reminder of a putatively divided
country (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Wolbrecht 2000, Lewis et al. 2015).
Over the next eighteen years, the trend of increasing partisan polarization held steady in
Congress and the Presidency, leading to each Congress being more polarized than its
predecessor, and the 114th gaining the dubious title of being the most polarized since at least the
early 20th century, if not in all of U.S. history. The effects of extreme partisan polarization on the
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governmental process have been numerous, ongoing, and almost uniformly negative. Legislative
productivity has been in decline, and the 112th Congress took the title of least productive on
record; the 113th would have stolen that distinction were it not for a last minute flurry of
legislation (Bump 2014). Bipartisan cooperation on legislation has also been in decline. Much is
made of the fact that the Affordable Care Act was passed on a strict party-line vote, but the much
less salient and ambitious Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 enjoyed only four Republican
votes in the Senate and three in the House (govtrack.us). Most recently, no Democrats in the
House or Senate voted for the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Lai et al. 2017; Lee and Simon
2017). Other bills, notably one to create a fund that would assist victims of sex trafficking, which
had previously enjoyed bipartisan support, have unexpectedly stalled over polarizing issues, in
this case abortion provisions (Steinhauer 2015). Partisan discord was also apparent in the 2013
government shutdown, caused in large part by Republican insistence on defunding the
Affordable Care Act despite an all-but-certain presidential veto, and again in 2018, when the
government shut down twice in a single month. None of this has been lost on the public, which,
not surprisingly, reports near-record dissatisfaction with all three branches of government
(Gallup 2018; Pew Research Center 2014a; Montgomery and Helderman 2013).
Although frequently overlooked by the media, contemporary partisan polarization did not
result from both parties moving similar distances toward their respective ideological extremes. In
fact, the Republican Party in Congress and the Presidency has moved to the extreme right, and is
responsible for about 80 percent of the increased ideological distance between the parties since
the 1970s, and is the most conservative party-in-government of the 20th century; their
Democratic counterparts, on the other hand, have moved leftward, but only slightly so by
comparison. Furthermore, the modest leftward drift of the Democratic Party is almost entirely
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due to the loss of relatively conservative white Southern Democrats, but the causes of the
Republicans’ sharp increase in conservatism remains a mystery. Given this, the puzzle of
increased partisan polarization in the United States since the 1970s is really a puzzle about
increased Republican conservatism over that time period (Lewis et al. 2018).
In 2004, Thomas Frank entered the popular debate over the red state/blue state divide
with the observation that blue-collar whites in his native Kansas had seemingly forgone their
economic self-interest to overwhelmingly support Bush and his fellow Republicans in the 2000
election, prompting the now-famous question “what’s the matter with Kansas?” To drive the
point home, he noted that the poorest county in America at the time, exactly the type of place
where one would expect strong support for New-Deal-style Democratic programs, gave Bush
over 80 percent of its vote in 2000, leaving him baffled that “so many people could get it so
wrong” (Frank 2004, 1). Frank argued that so many Kansans “got it so wrong” because they
were caught up in the “Great Backlash,” in which Republican elites stir up heartland whites into
a fit of resentful anger at a vague, but ubiquitous, liberal elite that works tirelessly to undermine
basic values of family, religion, hard work, and love of country, providing cover for a
Republican economic platform that favors the rich at the expense of these very voters.
Then, on June 16, 2015, Donald Trump announced that he was running for president, and
made the now-infamous claim that:
The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else’s problems. When
Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you.
They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and
they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing
crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people…It’s coming from
more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s
coming probably— probably— from the Middle East. But we don’t know. Because
we have no protection and we have no competence, we don’t know what’s
happening. And it’s got to stop and it’s got to stop fast (Time 2015).
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Like Frank, Trump recognized that a large portion of white America was angry, but he also
appeared to understand that out-of-touch elites were at best only a partial explanation for that
anger. Instead, Trump made inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric the cornerstone of his primary
and general election campaigns, and sparked a backlash more intense than just about anyone
could have imagined prior to the 2015 Republican primary. Soon, white nationalists were
endorsing Trump, and, during the 2016 Republican National Convention, a tweet by a white
nationalist Twitter account with the telling handle @Western_Triumph was projected on the
giant overhead screens of Quicken Arena (Frizell 2016). Although he never publicly accepted the
endorsement of any prominent white nationalists, Trump’s anti-immigrant, populist message
clearly resonated with these groups (Berger 2016). During the primary campaign, Republican
elites almost universally rejected this message, but Republican primary voters quickly began
moving into Trump’s camp, and eventually voted him into the White House in one of the biggest
political upsets in modern history (Rucker 2016; Enten and Bacon 2017).
Although Trump’s comments about immigration dominated news coverage of his
announcement speech, he also broke with Republican orthodoxy on a number of other policy
issues; however, rather than being castigated as a Republican in Name Only (RINO), his
popularity with Republican voters steadily increased (Real Clear Politics 2018). Notably, he
proposed to raise the federal minimum wage and to not only “save,” but expand Social Security,
Medicare, and even Medicaid. He also proposed to “rebuild our infrastructure,” presumably
through massive government spending, and arguably even alluded to a desire for some form of
universal healthcare (Time 2015). After winning the Republican primary, he continued to take
positions well to the left of the Republican leadership in Congress—for example, proposing to
raise taxes on the wealthy and eliminate the carried-interest loophole, and signaling his comfort
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with a large national debt—leading Henry Enten to declare him the “most moderate Republican
presidential candidate since 1972 (Yglesias 2017, Johnson 2016).
Trump’s apparent immunity to charges of being insufficiently conservative was clearly
evident in a remarkable exchange with Ted Cruz during the Republican primary debate in
Houston. In a previous debate, Trump, in response to a question about Obamacare, claimed that
some people would inevitably find themselves without coverage under even the best private
health insurance systems, and that, “as a Republican [emphasis added]” he would not tolerate
people “dying in the street.” During the Houston debate, Marco Rubio referenced Trump’s New
Hampshire comments, and Ted Cruz went on the offensive:
CRUZ: Did you say if you want people to die on the streets, if you don't support
socialized health care, you have no heart.
TRUMP: Correct. I will not let people die on the streets if I'm president.
CRUZ: Have you said you're a liberal on health care?
TRUMP: Excuse me. Let me talk. If people...
CRUZ: Talk away. Explain your plan, please.
TRUMP: If people -- my plan is very simple. I will not -- we're going to have private -we are going to have health care, but I will not allow people to die on the sidewalks and
the streets of our country if I'm president. You may let it and you may be fine with it...
CRUZ: So does the government pay for everyone's health care?
TRUMP: ... I'm not fine with it. We are going to take those people...
CRUZ: Yes or no. Just answer the question.
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TRUMP: Excuse me. We are going to take those people and those people are going to be
serviced by doctors and hospitals. We're going to make great deals on it, but we're not
going to let them die in the streets.
CRUZ: Who pays for it?
After a few moments of crosstalk, Trump concluded by saying, “You know what…call it
what you want. People are not going to be dying on the sidewalk” (Black 2016).
Why did Republican voters not only tolerate, but perhaps even reward, Trump’s break
with the strict conservative principles that have come to define the modern Republican Party?
Why was Trump immune to attacks on his lack of conservative purity, when so many
Republicans in Congress, to say nothing of his primary competitors, lived in fear of being
labeled a RINO? Given how popular Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and border wall proposal
were with Republican voters, could it be that the real source of the anxiety and anger that
characterize Frank’s Great Backlash was the rapid demographic and cultural changes, both real
and imagined, brought on by historically high levels of immigration in the late 20th and early 21st
century? In particular, is it possible that Republican voters’ support for the most conservative
party-in-government since Reconstruction was because of an intense racial-threat backlash in
response to historically high rates of immigration, and that Trump, by giving voice to that anger
and promising to drastically restrict immigration, mollified that backlash and the concomitant
demands for far-right policies?
As it happens, increases in the proportion of the U.S. population that is foreign born and
the ideological distance between the parties in Congress were both historically low following
World War II, but both began increasing in the 1970s, and were near their historic highs when
Trump gave his announcement speech. More specifically, from 1970 to 2017, the portion of the
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U.S. population that was foreign born increased from 4.7 percent to 13.2 percent; over the same
period, congressional Republicans’ average conservatism went from near-historic lows to
unprecedented highs (U.S. Census 2018; Lewis et al. 2018). Furthermore, by at least the 1990s,
immigrants were largely non-white, and were bypassing the traditional urban destinations of the
coasts for smaller towns across the heartland—places like Kansas (Census 2018). For example,
from 2000-2013, Minneapolis, Baltimore, and Charlotte received more immigrants in absolute
numbers than Los Angeles; over the same time period, the immigrant population in Scranton,
Cape Coral, Knoxville, Indianapolis, Nashville, Charlotte, Louisville, Charleston, and Raleigh
doubled (Wilson and Svajlenka 2014). In fact, Frank’s native Kansas provides a striking
anecdote; as Fig. 1.1 shows, its foreign-born population grew 458 percent over the last 40 years,
and, over the same period, its Senate delegation became about 350 percent more conservative:
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Figure 1.1: Kansas percent foreign born and Senate delegation ideology
There is, of course, nothing controversial in arguing that Republicans in Kansas are likely
to oppose high rates of immigration, but is there any reason to expect a full-fledged backlash like
the one Frank describes and that Trump exploited? I argue that there is: large influxes of nonwhite immigrants should spark a racial-threat backlash among Republicans for several reasons.
First, immigrants have been shown to create a sense of economic threat among natives (Hero
2010; Brader 2008; Citrin et al. 1997). Second, immigrants have also been shown to create a
sense of cultural threat, particularly among the dominant social group in a society—in America,
whites, and, especially, white Protestants (Fetzer 2000; Citrin et al. 1990). Third, countries with
more diverse populations tend to have smaller welfare states and more conservative attitudes
about redistribution, and immigration has increased U.S. diversity far quicker than disparities in
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fertility could have (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Alesina et al. 2001). Moreover, Republicans
consistently categorize immigration policy as too liberal, and voice frustration at government
failure to respond to their demands for more restrictive immigration policy (Gallup 2012;
Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Gimpel and Ewards 1999; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).
Finally, immigration occasionally spills over into other salient issue areas, for example, security
after 9/11 (Barry 2005). Taken together, this suggests that high rates of immigration should lead
to greater economic and social conservatism among Republicans who feel that their status,
values, and very way of life are under attack in a changing America.
Democrats, for their part, should on average show no such effect from immigration, in
large part because they tend to be members of non-dominant cultural groups, making them less
susceptible to cultural threat, and because they often come from diverse communities with a
history of hosting immigrant populations (Fetzer 2000). Moreover, while lower-income
Democrats, especially African-Americans lacking a high school diploma, often face a real
economic threat from immigrants, this effect should be mitigated by these constituencies’ strong
support for redistributive policies (Dawson 1994; Bowler and Segura 2012).
Kansas offers an intriguing example, but I argue that this racial-threat backlash should
occur nationwide, and in doing so help to explain the extreme partisan polarization seen in
Congress, and perhaps in the public. As mentioned above, the puzzle about elite partisan
polarization is not a question about why both parties have become more extreme, but a puzzle
about increasing Republican conservatism. A second element of this puzzle is why a nonideological, ostensibly moderate public has been electing these increasingly extreme Republicans
in the first place, as well as why they have not elected similarly extreme Democrats.
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Here, I present and test a racial-threat backlash theory that helps to solve both of these
puzzles. In short, I argue that increased rates of immigration have sparked a racial-threat
backlash among Republicans by creating of a sense of economic and cultural threat, unease with
redistributive policy in a multicultural immigrant society, and frustration with disequilibrium
between public opinion and federal immigration policy; this backlash has, in turn, led the
Republican Party to become increasingly conservative. Importantly, I also argue that the
Democratic Party’s coalition of racial and ethnic minorities and urban whites should not be
affected by increased rates of immigration. This theory helps to explain asymmetric polarization
by explaining why Republicans in government have become more conservative but their
Democratic counterparts have shown little ideological change. Second, an immigration-fueled
backlash is an “easy,” sociotropic issue whose effects are not contingent on high political
awareness or a consistent ideology, helping to explain how an otherwise unengaged, moderate
public can elect extreme leaders (Carmines and Stimson 1986; Key 1949; Citrin et al. 1997;
Fetzer 2000; Skocpol and Williamson 2013).
In the next chapter, I survey the literature on polarization in Congress and the mass
public, and on immigration and public opinion; I also develop my theory of racial-threat
backlash in response to immigration. Then, in Chapter Three, I test this theory on voters in the
mass public. Next, in Chapter Four, I test the theory on state legislators and citizen ideology in
the states. I conclude my empirical tests in chapter Five, where I test this theory on roll-call
voting in the Senate. In the final chapter, I discuss the implications of my findings, ways that
future versions of this study can be improved, and possibilities for future study.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theory
Introduction
In this chapter, I review the partisan polarization literature, then develop my theory that
increased rates of immigration have caused a racial-threat backlash among white Republicans,
which has pushed the Republican Party to the right, but have had no effect on Democrats. In the
literature review section, I argue that many existing explanations for partisan polarization—e.g.
gerrymandering, partisan sorting, increased income inequality—are, at worst, unconvincing, or,
at best, explain it only at the margins. Importantly, existing explanations struggle to explain why
contemporary partisan polarization in Congress and the Presidency is highly asymmetric. In my
theory section, I argue that increased rates of immigration cause Republicans to exhibit a racialthreat backlash based on economic, racial, and cultural anxieties, which has moved the
Republican Party to the right. I further argue that immigration should not spark a similar
backlash among the Democratic coalition, which is made up of groups not traditionally hostile to
immigration, namely racial and ethnic minorities, urban whites, and non-Protestant whites.
Polarization
Political polarization, in the broadest sense, simply denotes a bimodal distribution of
some political measure, most commonly ideology. Implicit in this definition of polarization is
that political actors can be arrayed on a spatial measure, most commonly a left-right spectrum of
ideology. Also implicit is that a bimodal distribution indicates that most of these political actors
occupy their respective extremes on this spatial measure, rather than most of them occupying a
space near the center. This, in turn, requires that polarized actors' positions on a given spatial
measure (in this case, ideology) are not only different, but extreme relative to one another
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(McCarty et al. 2016). Finally, polarization usually entails that the actors at each end of the
distribution are not otherwise disconnected, but constitute a meaningful political group.
A polarized group could occur around any politically relevant distinction—young and
old, rich and poor, urban and rural—but it is most commonly defined as partisan polarization,
meaning that Democrats are clumped to the far left of the ideological distribution, and
Republicans to the far right. However, Levendusky (2009) points out that Democrats and
Republicans could develop more extreme ideologies without increasing partisan polarization if
the parties were sufficiently ideologically heterogeneous, or, conversely, that partisan
polarization could occur without changes to individual ideology if party members sorted
themselves into sufficiently homogeneous parties (Levendusky 2009). Nonetheless, Lewis et
al.’s (2018) DW-NOMINATE data show that, since the mid-1970s, these two phenomena have
occurred in tandem in Congress, as the distribution of individual ideologies has become
increasingly bimodal, and the most liberal Republicans have moved to the right of the most
conservative Democrats. Given this, I treat changes to the ideology of the parties' members as the
relevant phenomenon, and assume that more homogeneous parties are a natural result of an
increasingly bimodal ideological distribution. In this sense, polarization is a measure of the
amount of ideological distance between members of the parties, be it the mass public or
Congress (Lewis et al. 2018).
While there is little evidence that the mass public has adopted the extreme ideologies
necessary for high levels of polarization, Lewis et al.’s (2018) NOMINATE data have all but
ended debate over the existence of Congressional polarization by showing that it has increased
steadily since the mid-1970s, and that the ideological distance between the two parties' roll-call
voting in recent Congresses is higher than at any other time in the post-Reconstruction era.
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Moreover, they show that polarization has been asymmetrical, with Republicans accounting for
the majority of the effect. Most notably, Republicans in both chambers have moved from a mean
DW-NOMINATE score of .26 in 1973 to .5 in 2018; over the same period, Northern Democrats
in both chambers have shown virtually no change, and the slight leftward drift of the party as a
whole is almost entirely attributable to the loss of conservative Southern Democrats (Lewis et al.
2018).

Figure 2.1: House Party Means on Liberal-Conservative Dimension, 1879-2014 (Poole and
Rosenthal 2015)
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Figure 2.2: Senate Party Means on Liberal-Conservative Dimension, 1879-2014 (Poole and
Rosenthal 2015)
Mass Polarization
As Figures 1 and 2 above show, there is no doubt that partisan polarization has occurred
in Congress, but Barber and McCarty (2013) identify an "emerging consensus" that most voters
hold moderate policy and ideological positions, and that mass polarization is limited to the small
portion of the electorate that is highly engaged (Barber and McCarty 2013; Fiorina, et al. 2006;
Asnolabehere et al. 2006, Bafumi and Herron 2010). Following Converse’s (1964) seminal
argument about the non-ideological nature of American voters, this literature finds that all but a
small segment of the electorate lack the skills, knowledge, or inclination to develop and maintain
any sort of consistent ideology, to say nothing of an extreme one—a consistent ideology need not
be extreme, but a bimodal distribution of mass ideology requires a large proportion of the public
to hold ideologically consistent views.
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Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the most politically aware members of the
public do hold consistent political attitudes, and that they make up a larger proportion of the
electorate than in previous decades (Abramowitz 2010). However, even this literature
acknowledges that the effect is limited to no more than twenty percent of the population, too
little to explain historically unprecedented partisan polarization in recent Congresses
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Lewis et al. 2018). And, while a recent Pew Poll (2014b)
found that growing proportions of partisans hold consistent beliefs across a range of issues, here,
too, the evidence suggests that the effect is limited to only about twenty percent of the
population, and there is little if any evidence that these voters' beliefs are both consistent and
extreme (Pew Research Center 2014b; Fiorina 2014).
There is, however, some evidence of mass polarization around a few specific issues, with
the largest effect surrounding abortion (Levendusky 2009; Garner and Palmer 2011; Mouw and
Sobel 2001; Abramowitz 2010). But here, too, the literature is far from unanimous, and Fiorina
et al. (2006) argue that voters are no more divided on the issue of abortion than they were in past
decades, only that they have better sorted into the party that reflects their views on this and other
issues. In keeping with most literature, Prior (2013) observes that, with the exception of abortion,
such issue-based polarization is limited to highly engaged voters. Moreover, he argues that there
is no evidence that increased partisan voting in response to clearer elite signals is the result of
more coherent or extreme individual attitudes (Prior 2013). Finally, Abramowitz's (2010) data
show that even Republicans and Democrats with moderate to high political awareness, in this
case as measured by campaign involvement, are virtually indistinguishable in their positions on
cultural issues, and that the only those reporting the most conservative or liberal positions on a 7-
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point scale show more than a ten-point difference by party on a wide range of issues
(Abramowitz 2010).
Though voters may not have become more polarized in their issue attitudes, the
relationship between partisanship and ideology may have changed in recent decades.
Levendusky (2009) and others convincingly argue that, although the distribution of issue
positions may not have changed much in recent decades, voters have better sorted themselves
into the party that best reflects their positions on controversial issues (Levendusky 2009; Garner
and Palmer 2011). Fiorina and Abrams (2008) insist that, even if voters have in fact better sorted
into the party that best matches their ideology, the ideological composition of voters in general
has not changed; in this sense, they argue that mass sorting neither leads to nor requires extreme
mass ideologies. The literature generally supports this view, and finds that partisan identity
remains a largely psychological phenomenon, and that voters are more likely to update their
positions to reflect those of their party, rather than switch parties (Campbell, et al. 1960; Carsey
and Layman 2006; Levendusky 2009). Carsey and Layman (2006) find that voters will change
their party identification to reflect their preference on an issue only if they consider an issue to be
salient and perceive a difference in the parties' positions on that issue; if the issue is not salient,
then voters are more likely to change their issue preference to match that of their party.
Levendusky (2009) echoes Carsey and Layman (2006) in his finding that voters update their
positions far more often than their party identification. These findings support the consensus that
only highly engaged partisans have developed ideologies that are more consistent, extreme, or
both. And, again these highly engaged partisans are too few to explain extreme polarization in
Congress (Abramowitz 2008).
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Although most voters remain moderate in their positions and ideology, there is strong
evidence that partisans have increased their antipathy toward the opposing party. Shaw (2012)
finds that the difference between partisans' feeling thermometer ratings of their own party and
the opposing party increased by 10 to 15 points in recent decades. Iyengar et al. (2012) argue that
this reflects "affective polarization," wherein partisans not only increasingly dislike the opposing
party as an institution, but also "impute negative traits to the rank-and-file of the out party"
(Iyengar et al. 2012, 407). Thus, “affective polarization” is the defining feature of any mass
ideological polarization that does exist. Moreover, they find that these views are only weakly
related to policy preferences (Iyengar et al. 2012, 2015).
Congressional Polarization
Thanks to Lewis et al.’s (2018) DW-NOMINATE data, it is now beyond dispute that the
parties in Congress face each other from either side of a yawning, and probably historically
unprecedented, ideological gulf (See figures 2.1 and 2.2) (Lewis et al. 2018). But while the fact
of polarization is almost universally accepted, explanations for why that polarization has
occurred are in many cases disputed, and at best explain it only at the margins, or under limited
circumstances. For example, as noted above, there is no question that the Southern Realignment
contributed to Congressional polarization by eliminating conservative Southern Democrats, and,
in some cases replacing them with more liberal minority representatives. However, although the
Southern Realignment explains a small portion of polarization, it cannot explain the loss of
liberal Republicans in the North (Theriault 2003). In addition, the Southern Realignment had
slowed considerably since the 1990s, but polarization has accelerated. Notably, the Republican
share of Southern House seats rose only 11 percentage points—from 60 percent to 71 percent—
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from 1998 to 2012, too small of an increase to explain the large increase in polarization over the
same period (Stonecash 2000, 10; House of Representatives 2012).
Changes in geographic living patterns as an explanation for polarization feature
frequently in the media—for example, the red state/blue state Electoral College maps—but these
at best explain polarization only at the margins. Prominent among these explanations is that
voters are increasingly choosing to live near like-minded people, creating predominately liberal
and conservative areas. Unfortunately, these theories are difficult to test, and while it is plausible
that neighborhoods or even cities have become more ideologically homogeneous, Fiorina et al.
(2006) are convincing that the states have not done so; given this, geographic sorting can perhaps
explain some House polarization, but little to none in the Senate. Nonetheless, Bishop and
Cushing (2008) argue that counties have become increasingly homogeneous, observing that in
the 2004 presidential election 60 percent of counties voted in a landslide—one candidate
achieving over 60 percent of the vote—but the last time this happened was 1972, when
Congressional polarization was near its historic low; if geographic sorting drove the trend of
increased polarization in the intervening years, landslide voting should have occurred in those
years (Bishop and Cushing 2008, 9-11, 131-132). Stonecash and Mariani (2000) find that,
perhaps due to sorting, income disparities across House districts are increasing, and that districts
are in turn realigning themselves according to income, with wealthier districts in the South and
North becoming more Republican and Democratic, respectively (Stonecash and Mariani 2000,
110-111). However, at the state level the opposite appears to be occurring, as poorer states vote
more Republican, and richer states more Democratic (Gelman et al. 2009). Given that the House
and Senate have shown similar patterns of increased polarization since the 1970s, driven in large
part by increased Republican conservatism, these conflicting findings for the relationship
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between wealth and ideology in House districts and the Senate leave income-based sorting
explanations for polarization inconclusive (Lewis et al. (2018).
Gerrymandering is another popular, but unconvincing, explanation for Congressional
polarization. Carson et al. (2007) find that substantially altered House districts produce
somewhat more extreme representatives than their unchanged counterparts, but the difference is
slight relative to chamber-wide polarization, and cannot account for polarization in the fixeddistrict Senate. Similarly, Mann (2006) allows that safe districts do sometimes lead to co-partisan
challengers campaigning on fidelity to party orthodoxy, but credible challengers are too rare to
explain the consistent trend of increased polarization. Others point to ideologically-driven
primary voters taking advantage of lower turnout relative to general elections to demand
increasingly extreme nominees (King 2003). However, the lowest recorded levels of polarization
coincided with the spread of direct primaries in the mid-20th century, and did not begin rising
until the 1970s, in some cases 70 or more years after direct primaries had become widespread
(McCarty et al. 2016). Furthermore, McCarty et al. observe that there is no statistically
significant difference between candidate polarization in midterm elections—when primary
turnout is lower, giving engaged, ideological partisans greater influence—and higher-turnout
elections held in conjunction with presidential elections (McCarty et al. 2016).
Increased party discipline also fails to adequately explain record-high Congressional
polarization. Rohde’s (1991) theory of conditional party government—given intra-party
homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity, the majority party in the House will exploit rules to
its advantage—is a good explanation for why representatives in an individualized Congress will
cede power to their party leadership, but does not explain why this homogeneity or heterogeneity
emerged in the first place. Furthermore, Rhode (1991) acknowledges that institutional features of
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the Senate, most importantly more heterogeneous constituencies than House districts, strong
minority rights, and fewer mechanism by which Senate leadership can enforce party loyalty,
limit the ability of his theory to explain polarization in the Senate. He argues that the weakness
of conditional party government in explaining Senate party unity is consistent with his
observation that in 1991 partisanship in the Senate had been increasing much slower than in the
House. However, Lewis et al.’s (2018) data show that the trend toward greater polarization in the
Senate, while weaker than in the House, has nonetheless reached historic highs.
Similarly, Cox and McCubbins’ (1993) cartel theory, which argues that parties enforce
discipline by privileging loyal members’ interests on the agenda, is reasonable on its face.
However, Snyder and Groseclose (2000) find that while party leaders can sometimes convince
legislators to forgo self-interest in favor of party when casting roll-call votes, they only exert this
costly influence on important, closely-contested votes. These votes are too infrequent to explain
polarization, leading Snyder and Groseclose to conclude that, “...party influence is only loosely
related to party polarization” (Snyder and Groseclose 2000, 193-195, 199). Cox and McCubbins
(2005) more recently refined their theory to emphasize the majority party's control over the
House agenda, but, like conditional party government, their theory is of limited use in explaining
the phenomenon of tandem polarization in both the House and the Senate. Finally, Jones (2010)
finds that polarization has created incentives for parties to cooperate in pursuit of chamber-wide
approval, and argues that his findings are in line with both conditional party government and
cartel theory. But, as noted above, while these findings illuminate some of the effects of
polarization in Congress, they do little if anything to explain its causes.
The literature has long argued that partisan elites can shape public opinion, especially
among their co-partisans, on emotionally resonant issues, and recent research finds that partisan
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activists often see their chosen issues become salient among their fellow party members
(Carmines and Stimson 1986; Layman et al. 2010). Levendusky (2009) builds on this
observation and attempts to reconcile moderate mass attitudes with elite polarization by arguing
that although the public is not ideologically polarized, increasingly clear messages from
polarized elites have enabled voters to move into the party that best reflects their views, leading
to greater intra-party homogenization and inter-party heterogeneity. He makes a strong case for
increased partisan sorting, but does not explain why elites polarized and in turn offered voters
clearer messages, at best answering only a portion of the polarization puzzle.
Masket (2011) argues that informal party organizations (IPOs) of party elites have
become increasingly powerful, and in turn have more assertively used their control over the
nomination process to demand ever-greater ideological fidelity from their representatives.
Masket’s study of California is a good explication of this theory, but suffers from the fact that the
reforms that empowered California IPOs took effect several decades ago; these reforms roughly
coincided with the beginning of modern polarization, which has continued apace in the absence
of further reform. Moreover, his theory does not account for asymmetric polarization; if IPOs do
in fact cause polarization, the two parties’ IPOs presumably operate differently, but he does not
explain how or why.
Bawn et al. (2012) build on Masket's work to put forth a similar, convincing theory that
coalitions of activists and interest groups use the nomination process to elect candidates who
support their agendas. They are particularly convincing in their argument that politicians,
knowing that they are reliant on these coalitions' support and that the narrow policy goals of each
coalition member are in aggregate more extreme than their typically moderate constituents in the
mass public, exploit "electoral blind spots" to enact their supporters' preferences. Similarly,
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Layman et al. (2010) argue that party activists with relatively extreme positions on one or a few
issues of particular importance to them use the open nomination process to demand that
ambitious politicians adopt similar position on a given issue, leading to nominees with relatively
extreme positions on a variety of issues. These positions then diffuse among party activists,
leading them to adopt the relatively extreme positions of their fellow activists (Layman et al.
2010).
Both Bawn et al. (2012) and Layman et al. (2010) provide plausible explanations for a
polarized Congress despite generally moderate voters; however, like Masket (2011), they fail to
explain asymmetric polarization. Moreover, these theories do not explain why this asymmetric
polarization has steadily increased over the past decades, despite no major reforms to the
nomination process. The authors do argue that new actors with more extreme views have entered
the nomination process, most notably abortion activists in the 1980s, but fail to explain why
these and other activists developed more extreme views than their predecessors; they offer a
potential explanation for how more extreme party elites have caused more polarized elected
officials, but not for why these elites themselves polarized (Bawn et al. 2012).
Abrajano and Hajnal (2017) test the effects of immigration on public opinion issues and
partisanship. Specifically, they find that whites living in close proximity to immigrants are more
likely to have conservative opinions about immigration, and are more likely to identify with the
Republican Party. Abrajano and Hajnal’s research supports my own theory that increased
immigration in a state is associated with greater conservatism among Republican voters and
legislators in that state, but that there is no effect on Democrats. However, this study differs from
Abrajano and Hajnal in two important ways. First, my theory accounts for the asymmetric nature
of partisan polarization since the 1970s—Republicans have moved to the far right, while
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Democrats have drifted only slightly leftward—by arguing that increased immigration should
affect Republicans, but not Democrats; Abrajano and Hajnal limit their study to Republicans.
Second, Abrajano and Hajnal (2017) provide compelling evidence that exposure to immigration
changes whites’ attitudes on specific issues and moves them into the Republican Party, but do
not account for changes in partisans’ overall ideology, and, again, do not explain why Democrats
have not exhibited a similarly large leftward shift in ideology.
Finally, McCarty et al. (2016) identify a striking correlation between inequality and the
percentage of the population that is foreign born, on the one hand, and Congressional
polarization, on the other, and offer a complicated theory linking the three. They argue that,
beginning in the 1970s, steady increases in the percentage of the U.S. population that was foreign
born increased inequality among all U.S. residents, but moved the median citizen up the income
distribution, because non-citizen immigrants are on average much poorer than citizens. This has
caused citizens, who, unlike immigrants, can vote, to view their relative economic situation as
improving, leading to fewer demands for redistributive policies. These citizens have in turn
joined the Republican party in large numbers, moving the party to the right. Around the same
time, the Southern Realignment absorbed conservative Southerners, further pushing the
Republicans to the right. This also increased the influence of liberal Northern Democrats within
the Democratic party, pushing it modestly to the left. McCarty et al. (2016) further argue that this
process led to racial issues being “absorbed into the main redistributive dimension of liberalconservative politics,” increasing leftward pressure on the Democrats, while all but eliminating it
from the Republican’s constituency (McCarty et al. 2016, 6-14, 138).
Garand (2010) extended McCarty, et al.’s (2016) theory (first presented in the 2006
edition) to the state level by testing the effect of state income inequality on Senate roll-call
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conservatism and individual attitudes and ideology, and found that income inequality is
positively related to both mass and Senate roll-call conservatism (Garand 2010). However,
Gelman et al. (2009) find that, while the relationship between higher incomes and conservatism
is positive within states, across states the relationship is reversed: the poorer a state, the more
conservative its population. In addition, the effect of income on partisanship is strongest in the
poorest states, and barely registers in the richest states. Furthermore, race accounts for about half
of this effect, as African-Americans tend to be poorer, to live in poorer states, and to be liberal,
while whites in poor rural states are almost uniformly Republican—for example, 89 percent of
white Mississippians voted for Republican John McCain in 2008 compared to 55 percent of
whites nationwide (Gelman, et al. 2009; New York Times 2012). This literature suggests that
inequality may not be as strongly related to polarization as McCarty et al. (2016) and Garand
(2010) suggest.
McCarty et al. (2016) identify an important puzzle in the striking correlation in the 20th
century between Congressional polarization and national rates of immigration and inequality, but
I argue that their theory is both too complicated to allow convincing inference and suffers from
the absence of an immigration variable in their models. Instead, I provide a simpler explanation
for the immigration-inequality-polarization puzzle: immigration creates a racial backlash among
native whites, increasing Republican conservatism, and with it, asymmetric polarization. This
backlash is enhanced by the increasing ethnic and racial diversity of the voting-age population,
which has come at the expense of the white voting-age population. As figure 2.3 shows, whites
have accounted for a rapidly shrinking portion of the presidential electorate since at least 1980,
and in the 2012 election dropped to well under 75 percent:
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Figure 2.3: White portion of electorate in presidential elections, 1980-2012 (Cizzilla and
Cohen, 2012).
As Figure 2.3 shows, the decline in the white vote share tracks closely with the portion of
the U.S. population identifying as non-Hispanic white in the U.S. Census. And, as figure 2.5
shows, as the portions of both the population and voters that are white have declined, the portion
identifying as Hispanic and black has increased:
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of Census respondents identifying as white (U.S. Census 2014)

Figure 2.5: Percentage of Census respondents reporting black or Hispanic (Census 2010)
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These trends are expected to continue, with Hispanics making up nearly a third of the
population by 2050, and whites losing their majority status, despite retaining a large plurality:

Figure 2.6: percentage of the U.S. population identifying as white, Hispanic, black, and Asian,
1960, 2011, and 2050 projections (Taylor and Cohn 2012).
Finally, using the 2011 and 2050 projections in figure 2.6, growth in the Hispanic share of the
population caused about 60 percent of the decline in the white portion of the population between
1960 and 2011, and is expected to account for about 75 percent of the predicted decline from
2011 to 2050 (Pew Research Center 2011). As I argue below, this suggests that native whites
should be particularly sensitive to changes in the Hispanic population, and especially influxes of
Hispanic immigrants.
28

As the U.S. population has grown more diverse, the parties have also become increasingly
racially polarized. However, despite persistent media reporting on the fact that Mitt Romney's
vote share was almost 90 percent white, the Republican presidential electorate has actually
become more diverse in recent decades, but at nowhere near the rate of the population at large.
Similarly, in recent decades the Democratic presidential electorate was very white--84 percent
white in 1976. However, the Democratic electorate has rapidly diversified since then, reaching a
minority proportion of 44 percent in the 2012 presidential election:

Figure 2.7: Percent of Parties' Electorate by Race (Cilliza and Cohen 2012).
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Figure 2.8: Non-white vote share by Party (U.S. Census 2014)
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Figure 2.9: White vote share by party (U.S. Census 2014)
Immigration and Public Opinion
Because determining the effect of immigration on individual opinion and ideology is a
significant component of this research project, it is important to address the endogeneity problem
inherent in this relationship: does immigration affect ideology, or does ideology affect attitudes
about immigration? Unfortunately, while the relationship between individual-level factors and
opinion about immigration has been extensively studied, the effects of exposure to immigration
on other attitudes, namely partisan identification and ideology, have scarcely been examined at
all. As I explain in the methods section, well-specified models including appropriate exogenous
variables help to mitigate this inherent endogeneity. Here, I survey the literature on both schools
of thought.
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Fetzer (2013) divides research on sources of opinions and attitudes about immigration
into socioeconomic and psychological schools of thought (Fetzer 2013, 302). The socioeconomic
school identifies many variables—age, for example—that are entirely exogenous to attitudes
about immigration, as well as others that are at least somewhat endogenous, for example
education. The psychological school examines inherently endogenous variables, including selfreported ideology and partisanship.
The sociological school has consistently found that greater educational attainment is
associated with more liberal attitudes toward immigration, especially in democracies, where
curriculums tend to emphasize liberal values (Coenders 2001). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007)
emphasize the role of education's effect on "cultural values and beliefs," and find little effect
from educational attainment insulating individuals from immigrant labor competition. In keeping
with this finding, Cornelius and Rosenblum (2007) find that immigrant labor exerts little if any
wage pressure on all but the most poorly educated workers, further suggesting that cultural,
rather than economic, forces explain the liberalizing effect of education on attitudes about
immigration.
The sociologically-based literature also consistently finds that older people have more
conservative attitudes about immigration (Hoskin 1991; Heath and Tilley 2005). However, the
literature is inconclusive as to the effect of other demographic factors, namely gender (Illatov
and Shamai 1998; Chandler and Tsai 2001) and marital status (Espenshade 1997; Givens and
Luedtke 2004). Fetzer (2013) suggests that gender and marital status likely reflect the effects of
other demographic factors, such as religiosity and occupation.
Despite Hainmueller and Hiscox's (2007) finding that the liberalizing effect of education
on attitudes about immigration is not due to its effect on workers' ability to compete with
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immigrant labor, extensive research does find that members of labor unions and those in lowskill or working-class occupations tend to be more opposed to immigration (Espenshade 1997;
Hoskin 1991; Fetzer 2000; Kunovich 2002). On the other hand, Citrin et al. (1997) and Fetzer
(2000) return conflicting evidence for the effect of income. An extensive literature finds no
effect from individual employment status, but does find a sociotropic effect in response to
changes in the national unemployment rate (Citrin et al. 1997; Hoskin 1991; Fetzer 2000). While
Schissel, et al. (1989) found that the regional unemployment rate had no effect on Canadian
attitudes toward immigration, others find that perceptions of a declining national economy
increase opposition to immigration in the United States (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and
Hempstead 1996; Chandler and Tsai 2001).
The sociological approach to immigration attitudes also draws on group conflict theory.
All else equal, blacks and whites seem to hold similar attitudes about immigration, and there is
modest evidence that Hispanics and Latinos harbor views similar to those of whites about the
proper level of immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001). However, those in marginalized cultural
groups often have more welcoming attitudes toward immigrants (Fetzer 2000), while being a
member of the dominant religious group tends to increase opposition toward immigrants,
including those who are co-religionists; conversely, members of disadvantaged cultural groups
are less likely to oppose immigrants (Fetzer 1998; 2000). Although immigrants themselves
usually hold more liberal attitudes toward new immigrants, the longer they spend in their
adopted society and the greater their level of acculturation, the less welcoming their attitudes
(Hood et al. 1997; Richardson 2005). More recently, Byrne and Dixon (2013) found that
attachments to both ethnocultural and civic-political ideals of American identity are related to
preferences for reduced levels of immigration. Finally, living in an urban area is associated with
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more liberal attitudes toward immigration, as is living in the Northeast compared to the West,
Midwest, or South (Hoskin 1991; Hood and Morris 1997).
Chandler and Tsai (2001) find that "group-comparison" variables, namely holding a college
degree and fearing that immigrants are a threat to the English language, are the strongest
predictors of immigration attitudes. Similarly, Wilson (2001) found that perceived threats to
group status were the best predictors of opposition to immigration among native-born
Americans, but that, in keeping with Citrin et al. (1997), perceptions of threat to individual
circumstances had a much smaller effect. Berg (2013) likewise found that group threat was the
strongest predictor of attitudes about levels of immigration and the appropriate citizenship status
of the children of illegal immigrants, but that symbolic racism was a better predictor of attitudes
about general government action regarding immigrants, especially government aid to legal
immigrants. The most consistent measure of symbolic racism in predicting attitudes toward
immigration issues was the GSS question asking if immigrants receive undeserved special
treatment, but Berg (2013) notes that his survey years, 1994 and 2004, followed recessions,
perhaps heightening the salience of government assistance to different groups. In keeping with
Citrin et al. (1997), Hoskin (1991), and Fetzer (2000), unemployment associated with these
recessions likely increased general opposition to immigration, including government assistance
for immigrants.
Traditionally, there has been at best only very weak evidence that partisanship is related to
opinions about immigrants or immigration policy among the mass public nationwide. However,
Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argue that a partisan cleavage over immigration emerged in the
1990s, when Republicans began taking increasingly conservative positions, and that the public
slowly followed suit. In particular, members of the public in states where a high immigration rate
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has made the issue salient show a more pronounced partisan divide than their counterparts in
other states. Moreover, when immigration is salient, attitudes among partisans tend to reflect the
parties' positions on social spending and the size of the federal government (Espenshade and
Hemspsteaed 1997; Citrin 1997; Gimpel and Edwards 1999), reflecting the literature's findings
that ideology is usually a better predictor of immigration than partisanship (Barkan 2003; Wilson
2001). For example, Gimpel and Edwards (1999) found very small differences during the 1990s
in Republican and Democratic support for changing the level of legal immigration, but much
larger differences among self-identified liberals and conservatives. More recently, Abrajano and
Hajnal (2017) found that concerns over immigration are increasingly associated with native
whites moving from the Democratic to the Republican Party.
Theory
I present a parsimonious argument that increased immigration has led to a racial-threat backlash
among native whites, leading to greater conservatism among Republicans because of economic
and cultural threat, unease with redistributive policy in a multicultural immigrant society, and
frustration with disequilibrium between public opinion and federal immigration policy. In turn, I
argue that this has led to greater Republican conservatism in the Senate.
Key (1949) proposed the theory of racial threat after observing that Southern white racial
intolerance seemed to be highest in areas with large African-American populations (Key 1949).
Over time, two schools of racial threat emerged. One argues that increased white racial animosity
in response to large black populations results from resource competition, political competition, or
both (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989). The other argues that, since the Civil Rights era, whites have
exhibited a conservative backlash in response to increased black visibility and social and
political rights (Kinder and Sears 1981; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Voss and Miller 2001).
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More recently, the literature has applied racial threat theories to natives' response to immigration
(Green et al. 1998; Frisbie and Niedert 1977; Rocha and Espino 2009, Hero 1998).
However, political competition with immigrant communities is unlikely to explain why
native conservatism would increase in response to immigration. First, Key (1949) found that
racial threat became strongest when blacks approached forty percent of an area's population, and
Lublin (1997) convincingly argues that responsiveness to minority constituents reaches a tipping
point of sorts when minorities constitute more than forty percent of a Congressional district’s
population, regardless of the representative’s race. In my sample years of 1970-2012, the
minimum state-level Latino population is .3 percent, and the maximum is 42.1, with a mean of
only 7.3 percent. Moreover, only one state, New Mexico, has a Latino population over 40
percent, while California and Texas both reach 32 percent near the final years of the sample, and
Arizona 25 percent. No other states have a Latino population over 20 percent in any year of my
sample. Given this, at most only four, and more likely only two or three, states are likely to have
exhibited state-wide racial threat in response to political competition, and in only a few recent
years. In any event, these four states cannot account for chamber-wide polarization in Congress.
A more plausible explanation for increased white native conservatism amid increased
immigration is that natives perceive both an economic and cultural threat from immigrants. An
extensive literature finds that sociotropic economic factors, such as perceptions of the national
economy or changes in per capita income levels, are strongly related to attitudes about
immigrants, but that one’s own personal economic circumstance is not (Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer
2000; Hoskin 1991; Fetzer (2000). Citrin et al. (1997) argue that this is due to elites in
government and the media using immigrants as scapegoats during economic decline. Because
immigrants tend to be a net drain on state and local government budgets, despite being a net
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contributor to the federal budget, economic threat should be particularly pronounced in the states
(Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Hero (2010) provides support for this argument with his
finding that Californians passed Proposition 187 in large part because of beliefs that education
and social spending disproportionately benefits immigrants. Finally, Brader et al. (2008) find that
news about economic threats from immigrants—displacing native workers or driving down
wages—leads to anti-immigrant sentiment only if the immigrants are portrayed as a stigmatized
out-group, which provides strong support for the argument that anti-immigrant affect results
from a combination of economic and cultural threat (Abrajano and Hajnal 2017; Hopkins 2010;
Santa Ana 2004).
Cultural threat, that is, the fear that immigrants pose a threat to “American” values, is a
similarly convincing explanation for increased white native conservatism amid immigration
(Citrin et al. 1990, 1997; Glen and de Jon 1996; Johnson et al. 1997; Hajnal et al 2000). In
particular, Fetzer (2000) offers a cultural-marginality theory of native attitudes toward
immigrants, which proposes that culturally marginalized groups—e.g. Catholics, AfricanAmericans, and Jews in the U.S.—are more sympathetic to similarly marginalized immigrants,
but members of the dominant cultural group—white Protestants in the U.S.—oppose the arrival
of such immigrants. Importantly, Fetzer's theory is limited to cultural marginality, not political
or economic "powerlessness." For example, he characterizes Jews in the United States or
Protestants in France as culturally marginalized, despite both groups being economically and
politically more powerful than, say, African-Americans or North African immigrants in France.
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Specifically, the cultural-marginality theory predicts that in the U.S.:
...the dominant white, Anglophone Protestants will seek public approval of their
cultural characteristics at the expense of such immigrants as mestizos, Spanishspeaking Catholics...Feeling culturally threatened by rising "multiculturalism" and
increasing non-European immigration, the WASPs react by fighting for...symbolic
endorsement of their culture (Fetzer 2000, 12).
Fetzer's (2000) tests find strong support for cultural-marginality theory as a predictor of
opposition to immigrant-friendly policy and support for anti-immigrant political groups, albeit
with weaker results for predictions of anti-immigrant affect.
In keeping with Fetzer (2000), extensive literature identifies cultural anxieties over
immigration to the U.S. Citrin et al. (1990) found that conceptions of nationality in the U.S in
the 1980s were marked by "ethnocultural or exclusionary elements," and that traditional notions
of faith in God and speaking English are central to popular conceptions of "true" Americanism.
They also found that personal effects from immigration played little role, but found a strong
effect from "issues of group worth and cultural recognition" (Citrin et al. 1990, 1147-1148). In
addition, since at least the 1990s, and probably since the 1980s, about half of the U.S. population
has perceived a significant cultural threat from immigration, and has resented immigrants’
perceived unwillingness to assimilate (Lapinksi et al. 1997). Glen and de Jong (1996) observe
that the most recent waves of immigrants to the United States "...are physically identifiable, and
they and their children will continue to be so" no matter how well they assimilate (Glen and de
Jong 1996, 30). Moreover, they argue that, by the 1990s, native-born Americans had begun
perceiving immigrants as monochromatically "ethnic." Similarly, Johnson et al. (1997) find
evidence of white resentment of the “browning of America” beginning in the 1970s as
immigrants began forgoing traditional immigration centers for small and medium-sized
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communities, and Hajnal et. al (2000) argue that white-Hispanic cleavages will likely supplant
traditional white-black cleavages.
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that greater ethnic and racial diversity in a given
society corresponds with less support for redistributive policies, in large part out of fear that
these policies benefit an out-group, which is often perceived as lazy and underserving (Hero and
Tolbert 1996; Alesina et al. 2001). In the United States, evidence shows that both increased
racial diversity and increased immigration lead to opposition to redistributive policies, and the
comparative literature finds that states with more diverse societies have smaller welfare states.
Moreover, this literature has found a similar effect from modern immigration as a driver of
increased multiculturalism. Given that immigration to the United States in recent decades has
been predominately Hispanic, the effect should be particularly pronounced in states experiencing
increased rates of immigration (Freeman 1986; Alesina et al. 2001; Johnston et al. 2010).
Furthermore, fears that redistributive policies directly benefit immigrants have consistently
featured in both public and Congressional debate, including California's Proposition 187,
Congressional efforts to pass immigration reform in the mid-1990s, and Tea Party anger over
perceptions that illegal immigrants enjoy taxpayer-funded benefits (Hero 2010; Skocpol and
Williamson 2012; Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argue that
"immigration has been translated into a redistributive issue..." (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, 297).
Finally, because immigration policy has consistently been quite liberal compared to
public opinion, and in particular that of conservatives, immigration should be a potent source of
frustration and anger at a non-responsive government perceived to be more responsive to
immigrants and the business interests they benefit than the average member of the public (Gallup
2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Gimpel and Ewards 1999; Skocpol and Williamson
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2012). Until the 1990s, both parties in Congress largely supported liberal immigration policies,
despite public disapproval; although Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argue that Republicans began
moving toward more restrictive positions in the 1990s, there has been no comprehensive change
to immigration policy, and in early June 2015—before Donald Trump launched his presidential
campaign—Gallup found that a plurality favored a reduction in the number of immigrants
coming to the United States (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Fennelly et al. 2015; Gallup 2018).
Amid this Congressional inaction, pluralities have consistently called for tighter restrictions
on immigration (Segovia and Defever 2010; Schuck 2007). The failure of the government to end
illegal immigration has figured heavily into Tea Party anger at the federal government, with 82
percent calling it a "very serious problem" (while 60 percent of the general public agreed)
(Skocpol and Williamson 2012). However, illegal immigration has become almost synonymous
with immigration of all kinds, given that, since the mid-2000s, 70 to 80 percent of respondents
have mistakenly claimed that most immigrants were in the country illegally Segovia and
(Defever 2010; Schuck 2007).
Here, I argue that the combination economic and cultural threat, unease with
redistributive policy in a multicultural immigrant society, and frustration with disequilibrium
between public opinion and federal immigration policy, sparks a racial threat backlash among
native whites. While backlash theory originally referred to increased white conservatism in
response to post-Civil-Rights era black empowerment, more recent interpretations have
emphasized changing demographic and political patterns (Voss and Miller 2001). Unfortunately,
the literature typically presents backlash as a you-know-it-when-you-see-it phenomenon,
complicating both theoretical clarity and operationalization. Masnbridge and Shames (2008)
provide theoretical underpinnings for a less colloquial, ideologically-neutral conception of
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backlash, but stop short of proposing a precise definition (Mansbridge and Shames 2008, 623624). Conversely, Lipset and Raab (1970) define backlash as an explicitly right-wing
phenomenon resulting from an in-group's perception of threats to their values and status (Lipset
and Raab 1970). Similarly, Hewitt (2005) characterizes white backlash as increased
conservatism in response to post-Civil-Rights “equalities discourses,” and identifies a “second
wave” of white backlash in the U.S. dating to the 1970s and the Republican party's increasing
racial conservatism (Hewitt 2005, 4-11). However, after Republicans began appealing to
working class whites through social and cultural conservatism, white backlash took on a
broader—and vaguer—conception as anger at “liberal elites.” In keeping with Lipset and Raab
(1970), Frank (2004) argues that modern conservatism is fueled by a backlash based on:
Outrage over explosive social issues...a crusade in which one’s material interests
are suspended in favor of vague cultural grievances that are all-important and yet
incapable of ever being assuaged. The hallmark of backlash conservatism is that it
approaches politics not as a defender of the existing order or as a genteel aristocrat
but as an average working person offended by the arrogant impositions of the
(liberal) upper class (Frank 2004, 5, 121, 254)
Frank’s characterization is appealing in that it is intuitive, but it, too, lacks precision, and is
inherently unfalsifiable.
I define backlash in the Lipset and Raab (1970) tradition as a conservative response by
native whites to perceived threats to their values and status, in this case from increased inflows
of foreigners. The combination of economic and social threat from highly visible immigration,
opposition to redistributive policies in response to increasing multiculturalism due to
immigration, and frustration with government unresponsiveness to consistent public demands for
more stringent implementation of immigration policy and lower inflows of immigrants means
that this backlash should be broad and spread across multiple issue areas. Post-9/11 security
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debates provide a striking, albeit recent and potentially short-lived example, as immigration was
quickly recast by many opponents as a threat to security (Barry 2005).
Here, I test the argument that this backlash has been growing in strength since the current
trend of increased Latin American immigration began in the 1970s. As mentioned, backlash is
something of a you-know-it-when-you-see-it phenomena that can be difficult to precisely pin
down, but an extreme example is found in the rise of the Tea Party following the Great
Recession—not coincidentally, the Tea Party emerged as Congressional polarization rose to
unprecedented levels. Tea Party members and rallies consistently called for greater conservatism
on both economic and cultural issues, all under the umbrella of the ubiquitous demand to “give
us back our country” (emphasis added)—a coded reference to “real” Americans. Prominent
among their demands was to end a perceived deluge of illegal immigrants and the "illegitimate
and costly use of government funds and services by illegal immigrants" (Skocpol and
Williamson 2012, 7, 71). In the words of one Tea Party member Skocpol and Williamson (2012)
interviewed:
I feel like my country is being stolen by people who have come here illegally.
People come in and have the benefits of taxes (sic), and the money spent on them
puts a burden on the state, which makes me have to pay more (Skocpol and
Williamson 2012, 72).
Skocpol and Williamson (2012) provide ongoing examples to show how anxiety over
immigration bleeds over into other issue areas. Perhaps the most infamous example prior to
Donald Trump’s candidacy for president was South Carolina Republican Representative Joe
Wilson's "you lie" rebuttal to Obama's State of the Union claim that illegal immigrants would be
excluded from Affordable Care Act benefits. However, bound up in these concerns about
government benefits is a pervasive sense of cultural threat stemming from the fear that growing
numbers of minorities and immigrants—who Tea Partiers see as almost invariably having a
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weaker work ethic and stronger sense of entitlement than "real" Americans—are fostering a
cultural decline that will render America unrecognizable compared to idealized visions of the
past (Layman et al. 2010; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Schuck 2007).
Then, in June 2016, Donald Trump announced that he was running for president, and
included in his speech the argument that:
When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending
you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems,
and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're
bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. (Time
2015)
Following his announcement speech, Trump steadily gained popularity among Republican
primary voters, eventually gaining the Republican nomination, and, defying most predictions,
going on to win the presidency. Throughout his first year in office, he cast immigrants in a
decidedly negative light, frequently insulting Mexico and Mexican immigrants, and lamenting
that the U.S. does not receive fewer immigrants from Sub-Saharan African countries and more
from countries such as Norway (Reilly 2016; Dawsey 2017). Despite the controversy generated
by these and countless similar remarks, Trump’s approval rating remained steady throughout his
first year in office at around 35 percent, suggesting that his base found these attitudes toward
immigration at least tolerable, if not attractive (Gallup 2018). Moreover, initial research into the
motivations of Trump supporters has found racial resentment to be a more important factor than
economic anxiety, an explanation that was popular with journalists and pundits. These two
factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but of particular note is the fact that Tesler has
found that racial anxiety leads to economic anxiety, rather than the other way around, further
suggesting that racial resentment is the most important factor. (Tesler 2016; Sides, Tesler, and
Vavreck 2017).
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Argument: Mass Effect
Increases in immigration rates should spark a conservative backlash among white natives for
several reasons. First, over the last 30 years, opinion polls have consistently found that large
pluralities, and occasionally majorities, of native whites have considered immigration policy too
liberal (Gallup 2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). In addition, immigration is salient across
multiple issue dimensions. At least since the 1990s, and probably since the 1980s, about half of
the population has perceived a significant cultural threat from immigration, and has resented
immigrants’ perceived unwillingness to assimilate (Lapinksi et al. 1997). By the mid-2000s,
between 70 and 80 percent of respondents believed most immigrants were in the United States
illegally, and the government’s response to immigration, both legal and illegal, was inadequate
(Segovia and Defever 2010). Moreover, increases in immigrant populations often lead to
conservatism on redistributive issues, for fear that immigrants are a fiscal drain, the most
prominent example being California’s Proposition 187, which sought to reduce support for
education and social spending; Hero (2010) argues it was sparked largely by fears that such
spending disproportionately benefits immigrants (Hero 2010. Finally, immigration has
occasionally had a salient national security dimension, particularly after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks (Barry 2005). Hajnal et al. (2000) go so far as to speculate that, in many areas,
the traditional white-black cleavage is being supplanted by the white-Hispanic cleavage.
The literature has consistently found that increases in immigrant inflows, rather than the
size of the existing immigrant population, are linked to backlash (Citrin et al. 1997). Hopkins
(2010) finds that local populations become more anti-immigrant not when living among large
existing immigrant groups, but when faced with rapid, visible changes in local demographics. He
argues that, “while levels of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice, changes are less likely to
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do so” (Hopkins 2010, 42, 56). Similarly, Green et al. (1998) found that new influxes of
immigrants spark an “admixture of outright racism, nostalgia, and self-interest” that leads to
increased racially-motivated crime (Green et al. 1998, 395-398).
Finally, highly visible immigrant inflows are more likely to elicit a white backlash
(Money 1999; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Increases in the visibility of immigrants to the
United States roughly coincided with the beginning of the trend of increasing Congressional
polarization. It was in the 1970s—just as polarization began increasing—that Hispanics overtook
Europeans as the largest group of migrants to the United States; by the 1990s, the height of antiimmigration backlash, over half of all immigrants living in the United States came from Latin
America and the Caribbean (Martin and Midgley 2006, 3):

Figure 2.10: Foreign-born residents by region of origin (Wasem 2013, 3)
Argument: Legislators
In previous work (Worth 2012), I found modest evidence that increases in the foreignborn population at the state level lead to more conservative white opinions on social and racial
issues, and weaker evidence for an interactive effect of immigration and inequality on
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conservatism. Given evidence suggesting that when an issue becomes important to a subset of a
party’s activists it will usually diffuse and become salient to most party members, it is reasonable
to argue that this increased white social and racial conservatism will lead to greater overall
conservatism in the Republican party (Layman, et al. 2010). I also assume that legislators are
strategic actors seeking reelection, and pursue that goal by responding to the preferences of a
somewhat broad reelection constituency by reflecting its preferences in their roll-call voting
(Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974). Because Republican legislators’ reelection constituencies are
overwhelmingly white, it is reasonable to argue that increased white conservatism in response to
higher rates of immigration should lead to greater roll-call conservatism by Republican Senators
(Bowler and Segura 2012).
In the next chapter, I test my theory that increased immigration has led to a racial-threat
backlash among native whites, leading to greater conservatism among Republicans while having
no effect on Democrats, among voters in the mass public.
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Chapter Three: Individual-Level Tests
Introduction
Following Mitt Romney’s poor showing among minorities in the 2012 election, the
Republican National Committee commissioned an “autopsy” of the party and its appeal to voters.
Among the report’s many conclusions and recommendations, it flatly stated that “[the
Republican Party] must embrace and champion comprehensive immigration reform” if it is to
improve its electoral performance among the fast-growing Hispanic population (Growth and
Opportunity Project 2013, 8). But by the next presidential election, the party had moved further
toward capitalizing on native whites’ racial resentment than toward appealing to the Latino vote.
Nowhere was this more evident than in Donald Trump’s speech announcing his bid for the
Republican presidential nomination, in which he castigated Mexican immigrants as criminals,
drug smugglers, and rapists; within a month, he rose to first place in a crowded field of primary
candidates (Washington Post 2015). Shortly thereafter, his first position paper called for a wall
running the length of the U.S.-Mexican border, mass deportations of undocumented immigrants,
and an end to birthright citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants—and his lead
grew. He went on to not only win the Republican presidential nomination, but, defying
expectations on both the left and the right, to defeat Hilary Clinton and become president of the
United Sates.
In Trump’s first year in office, he did little to temper his anti-immigrant message, for
example repeatedly insulting Mexico and Mexican immigrants to the United States, and
complaining to a group of Congressional representatives that the United States receives too many
migrants from “shithole countries” in the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, and too few from
countries such as Norway (Dawsey 2017). As journalists raced to explain the “Trump
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phenomenon,” his supporters expressed a range of economic, cultural, security, and demographic
anxieties created by immigration, and initial research suggests that one of Trump voters’ main
motivations was racial anxiety (Lind 2015; Sides 2017). Why has immigration resonated so
strongly with Republican voters? As explained in chapter two, I argue that increased immigration
since the 1970s has created a racial-threat backlash among Republicans, causing them to become
more conservative across the issue space. In this chapter, I test that theory in the mass public.
Argument
In chapter two, I developed my theory that immigration should lead to greater conservatism
among Republicans by sparking a racial-threat backlash in response to economic and cultural
threat from immigration, unease with redistributive policy amid growing multiculturalism, and
frustration with disequilibrium between policy and public opinion on immigration.
Since at least the 1990s, and probably since the 1980s, about half of the population has
perceived a significant cultural threat from immigration, and has resented immigrants’ perceived
unwillingness to assimilate (Lapinksi et al. 1997). Evidence of economic threat and unease with
redistribution is apparent in findings of a common fear that immigrants are a fiscal drain, the
most prominent example being California’s Proposition 187 in 1994, which sought to reduce
support for education and social spending; Hero (2010) argues it was sparked largely by fears
that such spending disproportionately benefits immigrants. Economic concerns should be
particularly pronounced at the state level, because, over the long term, immigrants are generally
a net fiscal cost to state and local governments, but are net contributors to the federal government
(Blau and Mackie, 2016).
Furthermore, highly visible immigrant inflows are more likely to elicit a backlash
(Money 1999; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Increases in the visibility of immigrants to the
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United States roughly coincided with the beginning of the trend of increasing Congressional
polarization. It was in the 1970s—just as polarization began increasing—that Hispanics overtook
Europeans as the largest group of migrants to the United States; by the 1990s, the height of antiimmigration backlash, over half of all immigrants living in the United States came from Latin
America and the Caribbean (Martin and Midgley 2006, 3).
Moreover, public opinion on immigration and policy have been in disequilibrium for
decades. Over the last 30 years, opinion polls have consistently found that large pluralities, and
occasionally majorities, of native whites have considered immigration policy too liberal (Gallup
2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). By the mid-2000s, between 70 and 80 percent of
respondents believed most immigrants were in the United States illegally, and the government’s
response to immigration, both legal and illegal, was inadequate (Segovia and Defever 2010). In
addition, immigration is salient across multiple issue dimensions.
However, there is strong evidence that Republicans and Democrats have different
responses to immigration. For example, Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) found that whites with
negative attitudes about immigration have moved into the Republican Party in recent decades,
and that these attitudes are an increasingly strong predictor of support for Republican candidates.
Similarly, I argue that a racial-threat backlash to immigration that leads to greater conservatism
should be strongest in the groups most antagonistic to immigration, who are disproportionately
Republican, and weaker, if present at all, in groups more tolerant of immigration, who are
disproportionately Democratic. Given this, any racial-threat backlash in response to increased
immigration should be strongest among Republican voters, and weakest, if present at all, among
Democrats.
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The first important group characteristic that affects attitudes toward immigrants and
immigration is cultural status; members of culturally marginalized groups—for example,
African-Americans and Catholics in the United States—are more welcoming of immigrants than
the culturally dominant group, which, in the United States, is white Protestants, who are
disproportionately Republican (Fetzer 1998, 2000). Along similar lines, higher symbolic racism
scores are associated with less tolerant views of immigrants (Berg 2013), and Republicans
exhibit far more symbolic racism than Democrats (Valentino and Sears 2005). Moreover, while
ideology has traditionally been a better indicator of attitudes toward immigrants than
partisanship, Gimpel and Edwards (1999) find that, by the 1990s, immigration had cleaved along
partisan lines as the Republican Party became more conservative on immigration (Gimpel and
Edwards 1999). Finally, beginning in the 1970s, white Americans began expressing resentment
over the “browning” of America, and, by the 1980s, white conceptions of U.S. nationality were
marked by "ethnocultural or exclusionary elements” (Johnson et al. 1997; Citrin 1990).
Because these group characteristics are far more prevalent among Republicans than
Democrats, racial-threat backlash in response to immigration should also be far more prevalent
among Republicans than Democrats. Granted, white Southern Democrats should exhibit a
similar response; however, the Southern Realignment coincided with the modern trend of
increased immigration, and, given that it was nearly complete by the 1990s, and that the whites
who remained in the Democratic Party were typically urban, members of a culturally
marginalized group, or both, few white Democrats in my sample years should exhibit a racialthreat backlash in response to immigration.
Finally, the literature has consistently found that increases in immigrant inflows, rather
than the size of the existing immigrant population, are linked to backlash (Citrin et al. 1997).

50

Hopkins (2010) finds that local populations become more anti-immigrant not when living among
large existing immigrant groups, but when faced with rapid, visible changes in local
demographics. He argues that, “while levels of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice,
changes are less likely to do so” (Hopkins 2010, 42, 56). Similarly, Green et al. (1998) found
that new influxes of immigrants spark an “admixture of outright racism, nostalgia, and selfinterest” that leads to increased racially-motivated crime (Green et al. 1998, 395-398).
Research Design
In this chapter, I use a series of regressions to test the theory that increased rates of immigration
lead to greater conservatism and affective polarization among Republican voters, but have no
effect on Democratic voters, as well as the alternative theory that increased inequality leads to
greater conservatism and affective polarization among Republican voters, but has no effect on
Democratic voters. Specifically, I test the effects of increased rates of immigration on negative
partisanship and partisans’ self-reported ideologies.
As stated previously, Congressional polarization has been highly asymmetrical, and owes
largely to increased Republican conservatism, so I approach mass polarization as a puzzle about
Republicans, rather than all voters (Lewis et al. 2018). Given the convincing evidence that
leaners are in fact "closet partisans" who behave much like those who claim a partisan affiliation,
both in terms of vote choice and policy positions, I include leaners in my operationalization of
Republicans and Democrats (Keith et al. 1992; Magleby and Nelson 2012). For example, recent
polling by Pew shows that leaners are almost indistinguishable from their co-partisans on both
specific issues and ideological consistency:
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Figure 3.1: Partisans’ and Leaners' Ideology (Pew 2014b)
The media frequently report that self-described independents have grown to be the largest
electoral group, and while this is true, the media erroneously present these voters as being "up
for grabs"—a claim that made its way into the political science literature almost 30 years ago—
and that "independents will decide the election." (Brooks 2012; Wattenberg 1986; Klar and
Krupnikov 2014). The votes of true independents may in fact be up for grabs, but twenty years
ago, Keith, et al. (1992) argued:
Those who leaned toward the Democratic party were very similar to outright
Democrats in their voting habits, opinions on the issues, and views of the
Democratic party. The same was true of people who initially labeled themselves as
Independents and then admitted they were closer to the Republican Party (Keith et
al. 1992).
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The American National Election Survey data (1970-2012) bear this out:
Voted With
Party
91.77

Voted Against
Party
8.23

Republicans
Republican
85.33
14.67
Leaners
Democrats
83.67
16.33
Democratic
83.22
16.78
Leaners
Table 3.1: Partisans' and Leaners' Presidential Vote Choice
As the above chart shows, leaners behave much like those who profess membership in the party
toward which they lean. Because these voters reliably vote for their preferred party and share a
very similar ideology, explaining increased Republican conservatism requires explaining
changes not just among strong partisans, but among leaners, as well, so I include leaners in my
subsamples of Republicans and Democrats.
Data
I use the ANES cumulative file for data about respondents’ demographic and political
characteristics, and my inequality, immigration, and state-level demographic data are taken from
the U.S. Census. The sample begins in 1970 to correspond with the decade when partisan
polarization in Congress began its steady increase, and to accommodate decennial Census data,
and it ends in 2012 (Lewis et al. 2018).
Hypotheses and Dependent Variables
Hypothesis 1: As the rate of immigration to a state increases, Republicans in that state will
report more positive feelings toward conservatives and more negative feelings toward liberals,
but Democrats will be unaffected.
Hypothesis 1b: As the level of inequality in a state increases, Republicans in that state
will report more positive feelings toward conservatives and more negative feelings
toward liberals, but Democrats will be unaffected.
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Building on Iyengar et al.'s (2012) finding of "affective polarization,"—increased support for
one's own ideological group or party and increased dislike for the other—I operationalize my
dependent variable for hypothesis one as the difference between respondents’ feeling
thermometer scores for conservatives and liberals. A positive coefficient indicates warmer
feelings toward conservatives than liberals. Both the possible and observed range is -97 to 97
(the ANES codes responses of 97-100 as 97). These questions were asked in all years of my
sample except 1978.
Hypothesis 2: As the rate of immigration to a state increases, Republicans in that state will
express more conservative self-reported ideologies, but Democrats will be unaffected.
Hypothesis 2b: As the level of inequality in a state increases, Republicans in that state
will express more conservative self-reported ideologies, but Democrats will be
unaffected.
When testing hypothesis two, I operationalize self-reported ideology as responses to the ANES
question asking respondents to place themselves on a 7-point liberal-conservative scale.
1=extremely liberal, 4=moderate, and 7=extremely conservative. This question was asked in
every survey year from 1972 to 2012.
Hypothesis 3: Increases in the interaction of the rate of immigration and the level of inequality in
a state will be associated with Republicans reporting more positive feelings toward
conservatives and more negative feelings toward liberals, but Democrats will be unaffected.
Hypothesis 4: Increases in the interaction of the rate of immigration and the level of inequality in
a state will be associated with more conservative self-Reported ideologies among Republicans,
but Democrats will be unaffected.
Hypotheses three and four are further tests of McCarty et al.’s (2016) theory that immigration
leads to greater inequality, which in turn leads to greater conservatism among Republicans. If
their theory is correct, the interaction of immigration and inequality should be associated with
more conservatism and greater affective polarization among Republicans, but should have no
effect on Democrats.
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Independent Variables
My explanatory variables are immigration and inequality. Inequality is the annual gini
coefficient of family income for each state.
The main variable of interest is immigration percent change, which I operationalize as
the yearly percentage change in the proportion of each state's population that is non-native
(Citrin et al. 1997). The literature has found that living among large existing immigrant
communities does not elicit a backlash, but that rapid, visible increases in the non-native
population do—ten thousand immigrants arriving in California is one thing, the same number
arriving in Alabama is another entirely (Green et al. 1998; Hopkins 2010).
. Immigration and inequality data come from the decennial U.S. Census, so I linearly
interpolate the data for the intervening years (the 2012 data come from the 2013 American
Community Survey estimates). Immigration flows are stable enough to justify this interpolation,
because Hopkins (2010) finds that immigrants tend to follow existing networks, and in counties
with immigration rates above the 75th percentile, the correlation between immigration rates in
1980 and 1990 was .62. (Hopkins 2010). Furthermore, I run robustness checks using two sets of
gini data that rely on yearly estimates, the first provided by Guetzkow, Western, and Rosenfeld
(2007), the second by Voorheis (2015; also, see McCarty, Shor, Voorheis 2015). The results in
models using these data are consistent with models using the interpolated Census data; however,
the Guetzkow et al. (2007) data end in 2004, and the Voorheis (2015) data have not been
officially published, so I report only the results from models using the Census data.
The interaction of the rate of immigration and the level of inequality is the product of
immigration and gini centered on their means.
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In addition, I control for education, because higher education corresponds to more
positive attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). This variable is a 7-point
scale of educational attainment, with 1 being "8 grades (of education) or less," and 7 being
"advanced degree.” I also control for individuals’ income, which the ANES measures as
quintiles. I include a dummy variable for gender (1=male), because women tend to vote for
Democrats more frequently than men (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004). Extensive research finds
that members of labor unions and those in low-skill or working-class occupations tend to be
more opposed to immigration, so I include a dummy for union membership (Hoskin 1991; Fetzer
2000). I include a dummy for Protestants, because members of the dominant religious group
tend to oppose immigrants more than those from more marginalized groups (Fetzer 1998; 2000).
Finally, I include two controls for economic anxiety. First, state median income captures
sociotropic effects similar to perceptions about the national economy (to ease interpretation, I
scale this variable so that 1=$1,000). Second, the ANES variable asking if respondents expect
their family’s economic circumstances to be worse, the same, or better, in the coming year is
included to control for anxiety about one’s personal economic expectations (Burns and Gimpel
2000).1
My immigration and inequality data are at the state level, so I include the percent Latino
in each state and percent urban in each state; these data are taken from the U.S. Census. I also
control for elite ideology in the states, because the literature suggests that voters update their
ideology in response to (elites in) their party (Campbell, et al. 1960; Carsey and Layman 2006;
Levendusky 2009). The variable is operationalized as Berry et al.'s (1998) measure of the

1

To better capture the effects of economic anxiety, I ran separate models that included unemployment, inflation, and
the misery index in the states, but none of those variables were statistically significant and they did not substantively
change the results of those tests; in the interest of clarity, I present only the model that includes state median income
and respondents’ expectations for their families’ future economic circumstances.
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ideology of the members of each state's government. Finally, I include a dichotomous measure of
border states, to control for the high salience of immigration in California, Arizona, New
Mexico, Texas, and Florida (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).
Methods
My hypotheses propose that immigration will affect Republican responses to my
dependent variables, but will have no effect on Democrats, which requires separate tests of each
partisan sample. However, simply running a separate regression on each sample relies on the
assumption that there is no relationship between the resulting error terms in each model. This
assumption is, in a word, unrealistic, because there are almost certainly state-level factors that
affect Republicans and Democrats similarly, and yet are impossible to control for. Given this, I
test my hypotheses using a two-stage seemingly-unrelated estimation model, which first
estimates a separate regression for each sample, then identifies any correlations between the
resulting equations and jointly estimates robust standard errors, which I cluster on each state-year
group of observations (Weesie 1999; White 1982; Peterson 2009). Finally, I use a chi-square test
to determine if the differences between the coefficients in each sample are statistically
significant. I control for fixed effects with a dummy variable for each year, omitting the first year
(Wooldridge 2009).
The dependent variable for hypotheses one and three—the absolute difference of
respondents' feeling thermometer scores for conservatives and liberals—is continuous, allowing
the use of OLS regression. The dependent variable for hypotheses two and four—respondents'
self-reported ideology—is ordinal, so I use ordered logit regression when testing this hypothesis
(Peterson 2009).
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Results
The results found in tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 provide strong support for my
hypotheses. In each test, the rate of immigration to a state was associated with more affective
polarization and more conservative self-reported ideologies among Republicans, but there was
no relationship between these variables among Democrats. These results do not support the
alternative explanation that inequality is associated with increased affective polarization and
more conservative self-reported ideologies among Republicans. Finally, the results did not
indicate a relationship between the interaction of the rate of immigration and inequality and
either self-reported ideology or affective polarization, casting further doubt on the alternative
explanation.
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Table 3.2: Seemingly-Unrelated OLS Regression
Conservative-Liberal Feeling Thermometer
Immigration
Inequality
Education2
Income
Union Member
Gender
Protestant
Economic Expectations
Elite Ideology
Urban
Latino
Median Income
Border State
N
Pseudo R2

Republicans
17.89***
(5.28)
32.63
(21)
1.97***
(.2)
2.21***
(.3)
.88
(.94)
4.25***
(.6)
5.3***
(.64)
1.7***
(.56)
-.02
(.01)
-.09**
(.05)
-.12
(.07)
.3
(.7)
4.2***
(1.6)
9515
.09

Democrats
-2.74
(4.67)
21.1
(17.4)
-4.15***
(.18)
1.1***
(.3)
.62
(.56)
-.27
(.48)
4.6***
(.54)
.94**
(.46)
-.017
(.01)
-.12***
(.04)
.03
(.07)
-.1***
(.06)
1.28
(1.5)
12758
.11

Standard errors in parentheses
***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1
Tests of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples
Immigration

Prob>chi2: .002

Inequality

Prob>chi2: .68

The results in table 3.2 support the hypothesis that increased rates of immigration are associated
with more negative feelings among Republicans toward liberals, and there is no relationship
among Democrats between immigration and feelings toward conservatives. The immigration

2

Because education is highly significant in both the Republican and Democratic samples, and because it is, perhaps
unexpectedly, associated with greater conservatism among Republicans, I tested the interaction of education and
immigration. This interaction term did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in either sample; in
the interest of clarity, I do not report the results of those tests.
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coefficient in the Republican sample is positive and significant (p<.001) indicating that when
immigration to a state increases, so, too, does Republican affective polarization. The coefficient
in the Democratic sample is not significant, providing no evidence of a relationship between
immigration and Democrats’ affective polarization. More specifically, the model estimates that
each percentage point increase in the rate of immigration to a state is associated with an 18.38point increase in the difference between Republicans’ conservative and liberal feeling
thermometer scores, which have an observed range in my sample of -97 to 97; the observed
range of the rate of immigration is -.113 to .434. Finally, the chi-squared test of the difference
between the immigration coefficients in the Republican and Democratic samples indicates that
they are in fact not equal at the 99-percent confidence level.
The inequality coefficients for both samples do not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance, casting doubt on the alternative explanation that increased inequality is associated
with greater affective polarization among Republicans.
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Table 3.3: Seemingly-Unrelated Ordered Logit Regression on
Self-Reported Ideology
Republicans
Democrats
.9***
.21
Immigration
(.31)
(.3)
-.3
1.26
Inequality
(1.34)
(1.29)
.1***
-2.6***
Education
(.01)
(.01)
.08***
.06***
Income
(.02)
(.02)
-.003
.0007
Union Member
(.06)
(.04)
.24***
.02
Gender
(.04)
(.03)
.36***
.39***
Protestant
(.04)
(.04)
Economic
.07**
.09***
Circumstances
(.03)
(.03)
-.001*
-.002*
Elite Ideology
(.0008)
(.0009)
-.002
-.009***
Urban
(.002)
(.003)
.0004
-.003
Latino
(.004)
(.005)
.2
-.6
Median Income
(.1)
(.04)
.03
.21**
Border State
(.09)
(.1)
N
9052
11444
Pseudo R2
.02
.03
Standard errors in parentheses
***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1
Tests of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples
Immigration

Prob>chi2: .01

Inequality

Prob>chi2: .41

The results in table 3.3 provide strong support for my second hypothesis that increased
immigration is associated with more conservative self-reported ideology among Republicans, but
not Democrats. The immigration coefficient is positive and significant (p<.001) in the
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Republican sample, suggesting that as immigration increases, Republicans’ self-reported
ideology becomes more conservative. However, the immigration coefficient does not reach
conventional levels of significance in the Democratic sample, suggesting that there is no
relationship between immigration and Democrats’ self-reported ideology. Moreover, the chisquared test of the difference between coefficients indicates that the coefficients on immigration
in the Republican and Democratic sample are not equal at the 99-percent confidence level.
It is worth noting that, in table 3.3, higher incomes are, as expected, associated with more
conservative self-reported ideologies among both Republicans and Democrats. However, the
education variable, while statistically significant for both Republicans and Democrats, is
associated with much more liberal ideologies among Democrats—as expected—but has a very
small effect on Republicans. (Both the education variable and the dependent variable—selfreported ideology—are 7-point ordinal variables). In the case of table 3.2—Republicans’ and
Democrats’ feeling thermometer scores for one another—perhaps the education variable is
capturing the effects of political awareness, which typically increases as education increases
(Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992; Converse 1964). In this case, increased political
awareness would explain having any opinion, much less a strong opinion, about members of the
other party. On the other hand, the significant, but very small, education coefficient for
Republicans could be the result of Republican politicians and the conservative media
successfully stigmatizing “liberal” as a pejorative, giving even Republicans with low political
awareness a greater likelihood of self-identifying as conservative than Democrats with similar
levels of political awareness are of self-identifying as liberal. If this is the case, perhaps the very
weak effect of education on Republicans’ self-reported ideology compared to the effect on
Democrats is due to other variables in the model—namely, immigration—explaining the bulk of
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Republicans’ variation on the dependent variable, while failing to explain any of the Democrats’
variation (Neiheisel 2016; Schiffer 2000).
As figure 3.3 below shows, as the rate of immigration to a state increases, Republican
respondents are more likely to report the highest level of conservatism on the 7-point selfreported ideology measure:

Figure 3.2: Predicted probabilities at different rates of immigration of respondent reporting
“extreme conservative” (7) on 7-point self-reported ideology measure
The results in table 3.3 do not support the alternative explanation that inequality is related to
greater polarization, as the coefficient on inequality does not reach conventional levels of
significance in either sample, and the chi-squared test does not support rejecting the null of equal
coefficients. Finally, table 3.4 shows that the interaction of immigration and inequality does not
reach conventional levels of statistical significance, casting further doubt on McCarty et al.’s
(2016) theory that immigration leads to greater inequality, which in turn leads to increased
partisan polarization.
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Table 3.4: Seemingly-Unrelated OLS Regression on
Conservative-Liberal Feeling Thermometer
with Immigration*Inequality Interaction
Republican
Democrats
s
-69.92
Immigration *
10.4
(180.2)
Inequality
(166.7)
17.29***
(5.53)
33.07
Inequality
(21.26)
1.98***
Education
(.21)
2.21***
Income
(.3)
.88
Union Member
(.94)
4.24***
Gender
(.6)
5.32***
Protestant
(.65)
1.7***
Economic Expectations
(.56)
-.02
Elite Ideology
(.01)
-.09*
Urban
(.05)
-.12*
Latino
(.077)
.2
Median Income
(.7)
4.2***
Border State
(1.59)
N
9513
Pseudo R2
.09
Standard errors in parentheses
***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1
Immigration

-2.6
(4.71)
21.17
(17.39)
-4.16***
(.18)
1.13***
(.3)
.62
(.56)
-.23
(.48)
4.6***
(.54)
.94**
(.46)
-.02
(.01)
-.11***
(.04)
.03
(.08)
-.2***
(.06)
1.25
(1.5)
12757
.12

Test of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples
Immigration*Inequality

Prob>chi2: .75
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As table 3.5 below shows, the interaction of immigration and inequality does not reach
conventional standards of statistical significance when regressed on either dependent variable—
self-reported ideology and feeling thermometer scores for liberals and conservatives—casting
further doubt on McCarty et al.’s (2016) that increased inequality leads to increased polarization.
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Table 3.5: Seemingly-Unrelated Ordered Logit Regression on
Self-Reported Ideology with Immigration*Inequality
Interaction
Republicans
Democrats
.41
9.59
Immigration*Inequality
(10.2)
(11.69)
.91***
.31
Immigration
(.33)
(.32)
-3
1.21
Inequality
(1.36)
(1.28)
.1***
-.26***
Education
(.01)
(.01)
.08***
.06***
Income
(.02)
(.02)
-.003
.001
Union Member
(.06)
(.04)
.2***
.03
Gender
(.04)
(.04)
.36***
.39***
Protestant
(.04)
(.04)
Economic
.07**
.08***
Circumstances
(.03)
(.03)
-.001*
-.002*
Elite Ideology
(.0008)
(.001)
-.002
-.009***
Urban
(.003)
(.003)
.0005
-.002
Latino
(.004)
(.005)
.03
-.07
Median Income
(.04)
(.05
.03
.21**
Border State
(.09)
(.1)
N
9050
11443
Pseudo R2
.02
.03

Test of Difference of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples
Immigration*Inequality

Prob>chi2: .57

As table 3.5 shows, the interaction of immigration and inequality does not reach
conventional standards of statistical significance, casting further doubt on McCarty et al.’s
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(2016) theory that increased inequality leads to increased polarization. However, it is possible
that the effect of the interaction at different levels of each component variable (rather than at the
observed values of each component variable) increases the likelihood of a change in the
dependent variable. Because of this, I estimated a hazard ratio of the effects of the
immigration*inequality variable at one, two, and three times the observed value of each
component variable. In none of these cases did the hazard ratio did not reach conventional levels
of statistical significance; in the interest of clarity, I did not report those results here.
Conclusion
Iyengar et al. (2012) conclude by noting, “The evidence is strong that partisans are affectively
polarized. It is less clear exactly what underlies this development” (Iyengar et al. 2012, 428). I
provide a partial answer to this question by showing that increased rates of immigration are
strongly associated with greater affective polarization and more conservative self-reported
ideology among Republicans in the public, but not Democrats. These findings are an important
contribution toward explaining partisan polarization for three reasons. First, these findings help
to resolve the apparent paradox of a generally non-ideological mass public, on the one hand, and
extreme partisan polarization in Congress, on the other. Identifying immigration as a source of
greater self-reported conservatism and increased antipathy toward Democrats among
Republicans helps to explain why Republicans in the public tolerate, if not outright demand,
increasingly extreme conservatism on the part of their representatives in Congress. That this
effect is present in Republicans, but not Democrats, highlights the second important contribution:
helping to explain why partisan polarization in Congress has been asymmetrical, despite rankand-file members of both parties displaying about the same level of ideological consistency.
Finally, these findings allow for a qualified prediction about the future of partisan polarization.
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Should immigration rates decline in the coming decades, be it because of stricter policy and
enforcement, changes in economic incentives for immigrants, or both, then we should expect
Republican conservatism, and, in turn, partisan polarization, to level off and decline.
These findings are particularly interesting in light of the growing urgency with which the
Republican Party must attract non-white voters if it is to remain electorally competitive. Should
historically high rates of immigration continue, these findings suggest that Republican voters
will become increasingly resistant to the efforts to attract minorities upon which the party’s
survival increasingly depends; worse, party elites will face increasing pressure to placate the
racial anxiety among traditional Republicans. However, the Republican Party may enjoy a stroke
of luck as it faces down the browning of America: should the post-1970s era of historically high
immigration level off and decline, as many expect given the sluggish global economy, then
Republican voters’ sense of racial threat, and with it their historically high conservatism and
affective polarization, may follow suit, freeing up Republican elites to appeal to non-white voters
without alienating their traditional base. Should this come to pass, an important avenue of future
research will be untangling the racial-threat effects of immigration and of fertility disparities as
post-1970s immigrants go on to raise native children. If Republicans continue to view these
second-generation minorities as a threatening other, immigration may be the least of the
Republican Party’s demographic challenges.
In the next chapter, I test my theory that increased immigration has led to a racial-threat backlash
among native whites, leading to greater conservatism among Republicans, on the policy mood in
the states and on state legislators’ roll-call ideology.
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Chapter 4: State-Level Tests
Introduction
In Chapter Three, I tested at the individual-voter level my theory that higher rates of immigration
spark a racial-threat backlash among Republicans, leading to greater conservatism, but that there
is no relationship between immigration and conservatism among Democrats. More specifically, I
found that higher rates of immigration to a state are associated with more conservative selfreported ideologies and more antipathy toward liberals among Republican voters in that state, but
found no relationship among Democrats. In this chapter, I test this theory on citizen ideology in
the states and roll-call ideology among state legislators.
In the midst of the Great Recession of the late-2000s, conservative anger over
immigration, government bailouts of banks and automobile manufacturers, and increasingly
liberal attitudes and policies on social issues, perhaps most prominently same-sex marriage
rights, coalesced around the Tea Party faction of the Republican Party. Amid this conservative
backlash, two young, ambitious, and ardently conservative Republicans governors, Bobby Jindal
of Louisiana and Scott Walker of Wisconsin, joined with their states’ Republican-controlled
legislatures to push through ardently conservative agendas. Walker generated controversy almost
immediately after taking office by quickly joining with Republicans legislators to end collective
bargaining rights for state public employees. This proved so controversial that a group of
Democratic legislators fled the state prior to a floor vote on the bill to prevent a quorum, and
protestors occupied the Wisconsin State Capitol. Nonetheless, Republicans in the legislature
successfully exploited rules to allow a vote and passed the legislation. Furious, Democrats
petitioned to hold a special election asking voters whether to recall Walker, but he continued to
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enjoy widespread support, and not only defeated the recall, but easily won a second term in
office three years later (Williams and Skocpol 2012; Stein 2105).
In Louisiana, Jindal’s cuts to both taxes and spending sparked less outrage, although
eight consecutive years of mid-year budget cuts eventually took their toll on his popularity (UNO
Survey Research Center 2015). Jindal’s fiscal policy was, by any measure, extremely
conservative: over the course of his eight years in office, per capita state government spending
decreased by ten percent, while the national average was an increase of eight percent.
Louisiana’s education budget was cut by 52 percent, and the state’s charity hospital system was
privatized. The Cato Institute awarded Jindal an “A” in its 2010 fiscal report card, but reduced
his grade to “B” in 2012 and 2014—not because of spending increases or tax hikes, but because
of his supply-side incentives designed to lure out-of-state businesses, including a film industry
tax credit worth 40 percent of all in-state spending (Kaeding and Edwards 2014). Jindal also took
a hardline conservative stance on social issues, most notably instructing Louisiana state agencies
not to comply with the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling legalizing same-sex marriage (O’Donoghue
2015). Fiscal conservatives criticized Jindal’s approach to “balancing” the budget repeatedly
with one-time funds—selling off state assets and raiding trust funds—and leaving the state with a
$2 billion deficit. But the policy reforms of the Jindal era were decidedly conservative.
Despite stirring controversy, the state legislatures in Wisconsin and Louisiana enacted
most of each governor’s conservative agenda, and voters awarded both with easy reelection—
Jindal was so popular that he ran for reelection unopposed. The Republican-controlled
Wisconsin state legislature eagerly backed Walker’s policies, and, following Jindal’s exit in
2015, the Republican-controlled Louisiana legislature went so far as to deny incoming
Democratic governor John Bel Edwards the customary privilege of naming his preferred Speaker
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of the House. What accounts for the hard-right turn in these states, and fervent Republican
support for their governors’ conservative policies? Could it be that Republican governors and
state legislators have exhibited a racial threat backlash in response to increased immigration
similar to the effect identified in Chapter 3 among Republican voters? Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below
suggest that this may have been the case in Louisiana and Wisconsin.

Figure

Figure 4.1: Percent foreign-born and state House Republican ideology in Louisiana and
Wisconsin, 1993-2014

Argument
In chapter two, I explained my theory that immigration should spark a racial-threat backlash
among Republicans in response to economic and cultural threat from immigration, unease with
redistributive policy amid growing multiculturalism, and frustration with disequilibrium between
policy and public opinion on immigration, but should have no effect on Democrats (Lapinkski et
al. 1997; Hero 2010; Money 1999; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). In Chapter 3, I found strong
evidence for this effect among Republican voters. In this chapter, I build on those findings by
testing immigration on public ideology in the states and roll-call ideology among state
legislators. I also test the alternative explanation that increased inequality leads to greater
Republican conservatism, but has no effect on Democrats (McCarty et al. 2016).
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My tests of the effects of immigration and inequality on citizen ideology in the states
support my theory—increased rates of immigration are associated with more conservative citizen
ideology, while there is no relationship between increased inequality and citizen ideology. My
tests of the effects of immigration and inequality on state legislators’ roll-call ideology is mixed.
In both the upper and lower chambers of state legislatures, my results are consistent with my
theory: increased rates of immigration to a state are associated with greater conservatism among
Republican legislators, but there is no effect on Democrats. However, I find that increased
inequality is associated with greater liberalism among both Republican and Democratic
legislatures. I discuss this unexpected finding in the conclusion section of this chapter.
Research Design
My first test is of the relationship between immigration and citizen ideology in the states, and
between inequality and citizen ideology in the states.
H1: As the rate of immigration to a state increases, citizen ideology in that state will become
more conservative.
H1b: As the level of inequality in a state increases, citizen ideology in that state
will become more conservative.
The dependent variable in hypotheses 1 and 1b, citizen ideology, is operationalized as
Berry et al.'s (1998) revised 1960-2013 citizen ideology series, which captures citizen ideology
in the form of "policy mood." These data are preferable to Erikson, Wright, and McIver's (1993)
static public opinion data, because they capture year-to-year changes in public opinion, thus
reflecting changes in the "policy mood" in the states (Berry et al. 1998, 328, 343-346). These
data are continuous, with a possible range of 0-100; higher values indicate greater liberalism.

My second test is of the relationship between immigration and roll-call ideology in state
legislatures, and between inequality and roll-call ideology in state legislatures.
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Hypothesis 2: As the rate of immigration to a state increases, the Republican delegation
in that states’ legislature will cast more conservative roll-call votes, while the Democratic
delegation will be unaffected.
Hypothesis 2b: As the level of inequality in a state increases, the Republican delegation
in that states’ legislature will cast more conservative roll-call votes, while the
Democratic delegation will be unaffected.
The dependent variable in hypotheses 2 and 2b, roll-call ideology, is operationalized as Shor and
McCarty’s (2011) mean ideological scores for Democrats and Republicans in each state
legislative chamber (Shor and McCarty 2011), which are calculated from state legislative rollcall votes in a manner similar to Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE data (1997). These
roll-call data allow comparisons of the members within the same state legislative chamber, but,
because the members of different state legislatures do not vote on identical bills in a given
session, the data cannot be compared across the states. To overcome this limitation, Schor and
McCarty (2011) use Project Vote Smart’s National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) survey,
which asks identical questions of legislative candidates in nearly all state legislative elections,
which allows them to generate comparable ideal points for each member of each legislature.
These data are continuous, with higher values indicating greater conservatism.
The sample for hypothesis one begins in 1970, to capture the beginning of the trend of
increasing Congressional polarization in the mid-1970s (Lewis et al. 2018). Both samples end in
2012. The sample for hypothesis two begins in 1993, the beginning year of the Shor and
McCarty (2011) data.
Methods
As noted above, the dependent variable in hypothesis one is Berry et al.’s (1998) citizen
ideology data, which are continuous, allowing for the use of OLS regression. However, because
they are panel data, I use panel-corrected standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity across
73

panels (Beck and Katz 1995). Because my n—states—is larger than my t—years—(50 and 42,
respectively) I also estimated a model with standard errors clustered on the states, but my results
were not substantively different than when using panel-corrected standard errors. Furthermore,
many of my variables, including a variable of particular interest, the state gini coefficients,
exhibit very little variation over time, so I also estimated a fixed-effects vector decomposition
model. The results of this model do not differ substantively from the panel-corrected standard
errors model. Because of controversy surrounding the fixed-effects vector decomposition model
(Greene 2011) and in the interest of simplicity, I present only the panel-corrected standard errors
results.
As explained in chapter two, my hypothesis that immigration will affect the ideology of
Republican delegations to state legislatures, and will have no effect on Democratic delegations,
requires separate tests of each delegation’s roll-call sample. However, simply running a separate
regression on each sample relies on the assumption that there is no relationship between the
resulting error terms in each model. This assumption is, in a word, unrealistic, because there are
almost certainly state-level factors that affect Republicans and Democrats similarly, and yet are
impossible to control for. Given this, I test my hypotheses using a two-stage seemingly-unrelated
estimation model, which first estimates a separate regression for each sample, then identifies any
correlations between the resulting equations and jointly estimates robust standard errors, which I
cluster on each state-year group of observations (Weesie 1999; White 1982; Peterson 2009).
Finally, I use a chi-square test to determine if the differences between the coefficients in each
sample are statistically significant. I control for fixed effects with a dummy variable for each
year, omitting the first year (Wooldridge 2009).
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My main variables of interest are immigration and inequality in the states. I
operationalize immigration as the annual percentage change in the portion of each state’s total
population that is foreign born. This operationalization, rather than the percentage of each state’s
population that is foreign born, is appropriate, because the literature has found that living among
large existing immigrant communities does not elicit a backlash, but that rapid, visible increases
in the non-native population does (Hopkins 2010; Green et al. 1998).
My measure of inequality is the annual gini coefficient of family income for each state
(U.S Census 2012).
My immigration and inequality data are drawn from the decennial U.S. Census, so I
linearly interpolate the data for the intervening years. Although this requires interpolating an
admittedly large amount of data, I argue that this is justified, because these demographic factors
follow very stable trends. In particular, I argue that immigration flows are stable enough to
justify this interpolation, because Hopkins (2010) finds that immigrants tend to follow existing
networks, and in counties with immigration rates above the 75th percentile, the correlation
between immigration rates in 1980 and 1990 was .62. (Hopkins 2010, 45-46).
I include several controls for several state-level demographic factors: median household
income; the percentage of each state’s residents that are under 18, over 65, and the percentage
who live in an urban area. I further control for the percentage of each state’s residents with at
least a high school education, because higher education tends to correspond with more positive
attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Finally, I control for the percentage
of each state’s residents who are Latino, and include Latino squared, because I expect very large
Latino populations to have a particularly pronounced effect on immigration attitudes.
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In addition, extensive research finds that members of labor unions and those in low-skill
or working-class occupations tend to be more opposed to immigration, so I control for the
percentage of each state’s population that is a member of a union, using Hirsch and
Macpherson’s (2003) updated data, which they compiled using the U.S. Census (Hoskin 1991;
Fetzer 2000; Hirsch and Macpherson 2003).
The literature suggests that voters update their ideology in response to (elites in) their
party (Campbell, et al. 1960; Carsey and Layman 2006; Levendusky 2009), so in model two I
control for elite ideology with Berry et al.’s (1998) measure of state representative’s ideology.
Berry et al. (1998) offer two measures of state representative ideology, one that uses a version of
the NOMINATE technique, and another that uses interest group ratings; I use the former.
Finally, I include a dichotomous variable South to control for unique political attitudes
among the eleven formerly Confederate states, and a dichotomous variable Border State to
control for unique attitudes toward immigration in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and
Florida (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).
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Results
Table 4.1: Linear Regression on Citizen Ideology
(Panel-Corrected Standard Errors)
Variables

Immigration
Inequality
Elite Ideology
Latino
Latino squared
Under 18
Over 65
Mean Household Income
High School
Union
Urban
South
Border State
N
R2
Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.05

No Elite
Ideology

Elite
Ideology

69.09***
(.02)
2.47
(19.69)

69.81***
(9.34)
1.45
(19.62)
.22***
(.02)
-.14
(.13)
.01***
(.003)
-.77***
(.12)
1.94***
(.18)
.7***
(.07)
.11
(.08)
.63***
(.05)
-.1***
(.02)
-.97
(.91)
-4.02***
(1.1)
2150
.67

----.29***
(.11)
.01***
(.003)
-.81***
(.12)
1.76***
(.16)
.6***
(.07)
.08
(.07)
.65***
(.05)
-.1***
(.02)
-1.72**
(.87)
-4.8***
(.97)
2150
.66

The results in table 4.1 support my hypothesis that increased rates of immigration to a state will
be associated with more conservative citizen ideology in that state, as indicated by the
statistically significant, negative immigration coefficient. In addition, the inequality coefficient
does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, casting further doubt on the
77

alternative explanation that inequality leads to greater partisan polarization (McCarty et al.
2016). However, this test includes all citizens of a given state, and does not make a distinction
between the effects of immigration and inequality on Republicans and Democrats, as my and
McCarty et al.’s (2016) theories do. Current data do not allow for partisan-specific tests of
ideology in the states, so I also test my theory on Republicans and Democrats in the state
legislatures.
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Table 4.2: Seemingly-Unrelated OLS Regression on Roll-Call
Ideology in State Houses
Variables

Republicans

Democrats

1.09***
(.27)
-1.6**
Inequality
(.74)
-.03***
Latino
(.005)
.0005***
Latino squared
(.0001)
-.02***
Under 18
(.003)
-.14***
Over 65
(.006)
.02***
Mean Household Income
(.002)
.01***
High School
(.004)
-.005*
Union
(.003)
.002
Urban
(.001)
-.08**
South
(.03)
.77***
Border State
(.06)
N
811
2
R
.61
Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1

.09
(.28)
-4.15***
(.74)
-.02***
(.004)
.0002**
(.00008)
.03***
(.003)
.001
(.009)
-.01
(.001)
-.05***
(.003)
-.02***
(.003)
.005***
(.0009)
-.01
(.03)
-.37***
(.06)
911
.75

Immigration

Tests of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples
Immigration

Prob>chi2: .01

Inequality

Prob>chi2: .02
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Table 4.3: Seemingly-Unrelated OLS Regression on Roll-Call
Ideology in State Senates
Republica
ns

Variables

20.28***
(5.79)
-2.86***
Inequality
(.8)
-.03***
Latino
(.005)
.0005***
Latino squared
(.0001)
-.02***
Under 18
(.003)
-.13***
Over 65
(.007)
-.02***
Mean Household Income
(.002)
-.004
High School
(.003)
.002
Union
(.003)
.002
Urban
(.001)
-.05
South
(.04)
.69***
Border State
(.07)
N
823
2
R
.51
Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1
Immigration

Democrats
.44
(.45)
-6.04***
(.77)
-.009*
(.005)
.0001
(.0001)
.02***
(.003)
.01
(.008)
-.02***
(.002)
-.05***
(.004)
-.02***
(.003)
.008***
(.001)
-.05
(.03)
-.44***
(.06)
823
.63

Tests of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples
Immigration

Prob>chi2: .49

Inequality

Prob>chi2: 003

The results in tables 4.2 and 4.3 support my second hypothesis that when a state
experiences increased rates of immigration, the Republican delegation to that state’s legislature
will become more conservative, but Democrats will show no change. Among Republican
legislators in state house and senate chambers, the immigration coefficient is significant at the
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99-percent confidence level and is positive, indicating greater conservatism; among Democrats,
the immigration coefficient does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In the
model of house members, the chi-square test of the difference of the means shows that there is a
statistically significant difference between the immigration coefficients for Republicans and
Democrats, but the difference is not significant in the senate model. However, the immigration
coefficient is not significant in the Democratic subsample in either model, but is for the
Republican subsample in both models, suggesting that the effect is limited to Republicans.
The predicted effects of immigration at its highest and lowest observed values (-.207 and
.424, respectively) on Republicans’ roll call ideology when all other variables are held at their
mean values is as follows. At the lowest observed value for immigration, the predicted mean roll
call ideology of state house Republicans is .4, a decrease of .28, or 16 percent, from the observed
mean roll-call ideology of .68; the predicted value of at the maximum observed value of
immigration is 1.09, and increase of .41, or 24 percent. Performing the same test of predicted
values in the state senates, where the mean roll-call ideology is also .68, returns a predicted value
when immigration is set at its lowest value of .44, a decrease of .24, or 10 percent; at the highest
immigration value, the predicted value of state senate roll-call ideology is 1.02, an increase of
.34, or 15 percent.3
Immigration at observed minimum (-.207)

Immigration at observed maximum (.424)

House Republicans roll-call ideology: -16%

House Republicans’ roll-call ideology: +24%

Senate Republicans’ roll-call ideology: -24%

Senate Republicans’ roll-call ideology: +15%

Table 4.4: predicted values of Republicans’ mean roll-call ideology in state houses and senates
at minimum and maximum observed values of immigration
3

Shor and McCarty (2011) do not specify the possible range of their state legislative roll-call data, so I calculated
the percentages in this paragraph based on the observed ranges in the data. The observed range among state house
Republicans is -.17 to 1.53; the observed range among state senate Republicans is -.62 to 1.7.
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The results of my test of hypothesis 2b, that increased levels of inequality in a state are
associated with increased conservatism among that state’s Republican delegation to the state
legislature, but will have no relationship with Democrats’ ideology, are mixed. In both models,
the inequality coefficients for both Republicans and Democrats is statistically significant at the
95 percent confidence level, but the negative coefficient indicates that both Democrats and
Republicans display more liberal roll-call behavior amid increased inequality. Moreover, the chisquare test for difference of the means shows that the differences between the inequality
coefficients for each party are statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level in state
houses, but not in state senates. This unexpected result further casts doubt on the alternative
theory that inequality leads to greater polarization. In fairness, the inequality coefficient for the
Democratic sample is larger than the coefficient for the Republican sample, which suggests that,
all else equal, increased inequality could be a cause of increased ideological distance between the
parties. However, contemporary partisan polarization is highly asymmetrical, with Republicans
having moved much further to the right than Democrats have to the left; given this, the fact that
inequality is associated with Republicans becoming more liberal casts further doubt on the
alternative explanation that inequality best explains asymmetrical partisan polarization.
Conclusion
My tests of the relationship between the rate of immigration to a state and ideology among both
citizens and state legislators support my theory that increased immigration leads to a racial-threat
backlash, and in turn greater conservatism among Republicans, but has no effect among
Democrats. Furthermore, these results are consistent with my findings in Chapter 3 that exposure
to increased immigration is associated with greater conservatism among Republican voters, but
has no effect on Democratic voters. My findings about citizen ideology provide only very
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qualified support for my theory, because I am unable to test partisan subsamples of citizen
ideology in the states. However, when coupled with the strong results showing greater
conservatism amid increased immigration among Republican delegations to state legislatures,
but no change among Democrats, I find strong support for my theory.
The finding that inequality is associated with greater liberalism among both Democratic and
Republican delegations to state legislatures is unexpected, and deserves greater attention in
future studies. On the one hand, in both chambers of state legislatures, Democrats show much
greater liberalism in response to inequality than do Republicans, suggesting that inequality may
help to explain some of the distance between the parties in a given state legislature; however,
given that Republicans show greater liberalism amid higher levels of inequality, any relationship
between inequality and increased distance between the parties is likely very limited. On the other
hand, I find that immigration is associated with ideological change only among Republican
delegations, indicating that is likely a far more important factor in explaining partisan
polarization in state legislatures than inequality. Moreover, the absence of a relationship among
Democrats is consistent with the asymmetric polarization observed in Congress, providing
further evidence that immigration is an important factor in partisan polarization in state
legislatures.
These findings are consistent with the contemporary trend of Republicans increasingly bypassing
a gridlocked Congress and using state governments to enact conservative policies on issues
ranging from redistricting, to taxes and spending, to same-sex marriage rights. On the other hand,
Democrats have been characterized as failing to match their success in national elections in state
legislative and gubernatorial elections. These results suggest that immigration to the states may
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be prompting Republicans in state governments to pursue increasingly conservative policies
(Wilson 2015).
In the next chapter, I build on my findings about the relationship between immigration and rollcall ideology in the state legislatures by testing the relationship between immigration and rollcall ideology in the U.S. Senate.
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Chapter 5: Congressional-Level Tests
Introduction
When considered in light of contemporary partisan gridlock and rancor, the American Political
Science Association’s (APSA) 1950 special report calling for reforms to create stronger, more
disciplined parties that would offer voters clear alternatives might bring to mind the
admonishment to be careful what you wish for (APSA 1950). Given that many post-war
Democratic representatives’ roll-call voting records were to the right of many Republicans, and
vice versa, perhaps APSA’s argument was well taken then, but in 2012 Americans gave
Congress its lowest election-year approval ratings ever, and evidence suggests that frustration
with Congress’ inability to compromise and cooperate may be to blame (Gallup 2012). Twentyfour years after the APSA report, David Mayhew described the party system in Congress as
being in “slow decline,” and argued that the theoretical possibility that Congress could devolve
into internecine, zero-sum conflict was nearly unimaginable (Mayhew 1974, 104-105).
Curiously, Mayhew published that assessment just as the parties began drifting apart, a trend that
continues today and has left the 115th Congress the most polarized since Reconstruction—maybe
ever (Lewis et al. 2018). This polarization has led Congressional moderates to retire in
significant numbers, driven citizen approval of Congress to all-time lows, hampered
Washington’s ability to deal with mounting fiscal challenges, and contributed to the most
rancorous Supreme Court confirmation hearings of the modern era (Lewis et al. 2018; Paletta
2018; Snell 2018).
Despite unprecedented levels of Congressional polarization (herein, “polarization”) the
political science literature has made only halting progress toward explaining its causes, much
less proposing solutions. To date, the most compelling explanations have been rooted in the
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striking correlation between immigration, inequality, and polarization, but while the correlation
is clear, the prevailing theory linking these phenomena is at best murky (McCarty et al. 2016). In
Chapter 3, I found that increased rates of immigration to a state are associated with greater
affective polarization and more conservative self-reported ideologies among Republican voters
in that state, but are not associated with any change among Democrats; I had similar findings in
Chapter 4 for citizen ideology in the states and state legislators. In this chapter, I test this theory
on Senators’ roll-call ideology.
Argument
I argue that increases in the rate of states’ immigration are positively related to Republican
Senators’ roll-call conservatism, but that there is no relationship between rates of immigration to
the states’ and Democratic Senators roll-call ideology. My argument differs from McCarty et al.
(2016) and Garand’s (2010) in two important ways. First, I argue that immigration leads to
polarization by causing a conservative backlash among white natives, rather than affecting
voters’ perceptions of their relative economic situation (Key 1949; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989;
Kinder and Sears 1981; Green et al. 1998; Rocha and Espino 2009, Hero 1998).
In Chapter 3, I found that increased rates of immigration to a state are associated with
greater affective polarization and more conservative self-reported ideologies among Republican
voters in that state, but are not associated with any change among Democrats. Given evidence
suggesting that when an issue becomes important to a subset of a party’s activists it will usually
diffuse and become salient to most party members, it is reasonable to argue that this increased
white social and racial conservatism will lead to greater overall conservatism in the Republican
party (Layman, et al. 2010). I also assume that Senators are strategic actors seeking reelection,
and pursue that goal by responding to the preferences of a somewhat broad reelection
constituency by reflecting its preferences in their roll-call voting (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974,).
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Because Republican Senators’ reelection constituencies are overwhelmingly white, it is
reasonable to argue that increased white conservatism in response to higher rates of immigration
should lead to greater roll-call conservatism by Republican Senators (Bowler and Segura 2012).
Increases in immigration rates should spark a conservative backlash among white natives for
several reasons. First, over the last 30 years, opinion polls have consistently found that large
pluralities, and occasionally majorities, of native whites have considered immigration policy too
liberal (Gallup 2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). In addition, immigration is salient across
multiple issue dimensions. At least since the 1990s, and probably since the 1980s, about half of
the population has perceived a significant cultural threat from immigration, and has resented
immigrants’ perceived unwillingness to assimilate (Lapinksi et al. 1997). By the mid-2000s,
between 70 and 80 percent of respondents believed most immigrants were in the United States
illegally, and the government’s response to immigration, both legal and illegal, was inadequate
(Segovia and Defever 2010). Moreover, increases in immigrant populations often lead to
conservatism on redistributive issues, for fear that immigrants are a fiscal drain, the most
prominent example being California’s Proposition 187, which sought to reduce support for
education and social spending; Hero (2010) argues it was sparked largely by fears that such
spending disproportionately benefits immigrants (Hero 2010. Finally, immigration has
occasionally had a salient national security dimension, particularly after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks (Barry 2005). Hajnal et al. (2000) go so far as to speculate that, in many areas,
the traditional white-black cleavage is being supplanted by the white-Hispanic cleavage.
The literature has consistently found that increases in immigrant inflows, rather than the
size of the existing immigrant population, are linked to backlash (Citrin et al. 1997). Hopkins
(2010) finds that local populations become more anti-immigrant not when living among large

87

existing immigrant groups, but when faced with rapid, visible changes in local demographics. He
argues that, “while levels of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice, changes are less likely to
do so” (Hopkins 2010, 42, 56). Similarly, Green et al. (1998) found that new influxes of
immigrants spark an “admixture of outright racism, nostalgia, and self-interest” that leads to
increased racially-motivated crime (Green et al. 1998, 395-398).
Finally, highly visible immigrant inflows are more likely to elicit a white backlash
(Money 1999; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Increases in the visibility of immigrants to the
United States roughly coincided with the beginning of the trend of increasing Congressional
polarization. It was in the 1970s—just as polarization began increasing—that Hispanics overtook
Europeans as the largest group of migrants to the United States; by the 1990s, the height of antiimmigration backlash, over half of all immigrants living in the United States came from Latin
America and the Caribbean (Martin and Midgley 2006, 3).
Research Design
Dependent Variable
My dependent variable is Senators’ roll-call ideology, measured by their first dimension
DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). These scores have possible values of -1 to 1,
with low values denoting liberalism and high values conservatism. The observed range in my
data is -.915 to .846. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) also measure representatives’ ideology on a
second dimension that captures highly salient issues, for example racial issues during the Civil
Rights era, but find that including this dimension only slightly improves the first-dimensions 84
percent accuracy in predicting future roll-call votes. Given this, using only the first-dimension
score is justifiable on grounds of simplicity (McCarty et al. 2016). I include the years 1970-2012
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because the current trend of Congressional polarization began in the mid-1970s (see Figures 2.1
and 2.2).
Independent Variables
I operationalize immigration as the biennial percent change in the proportion of each state’s
population that is foreign born, with observed values of -.12 to .17. From 1994-2012, these data
are available biennially from the Current Population Survey. From 1970-1993, these data are
only available every ten years in the U.S. Census, so I interpolate the intervening observations as
a linear function of the difference between the value reported in each Census (U.S. Census
2012). Although this results in interpolating a substantial amount of data, the stability of
immigrant flows justifies doing so. For example, Hopkins (2010) finds that immigrants tend to
follow existing networks, and in counties with immigration rates above the 75th percentile, the
correlation between immigration rates in 1980 and 1990 was .62. (Hopkins 2010).
I measure state inequality with gini coefficients drawn from Guetzkow, Western, and
Rosenfeld’s (2007) data set of state income and inequality. A gini coefficient of 0 indicates
perfect equality, and 1 perfect inequality; the observed values in my data are .272 to .485. These
data have been rescaled by Garand (2010) to have values between 0 and 1 (Garand 2010, 1114).4
Finally, in the party-effects model I include a dichotomous variable Republican, which is coded
1 for members of the Republican Party, 0 for all others. The lone study investigating state-level
effects on polarization includes a dummy variable capturing Republican Senators (Garand 2010,
1116-1117). Simply regressing first-dimension DW-Nominate scores on a dichotomous variable
coded 1=Republican yields an R2 of .68; given this, I also test my hypotheses using a model

4

Because the gini coefficient is a continuous variable and unit changes in it convey meaningful information, the
original, non-scaled data are preferable, and should be used in revised versions of this study. Unfortunately, the
nature of my data—a varying number of DW-Nominate observations for each state in each Congress—make adding
the non-scaled gini coefficients a time-intensive undertaking that was not feasible for this project.
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without the party dummy. In all of my models I control for fixed-effects in different sessions of
Congress with dummy variables for each Congress5.
Control Variables
I expect Southern states to be more conservative as a rule, as well as more hostile to
increased rates of immigration. I control for region with a dummy variable for South, which is
coded 1 for the 11 Confederate states. Using Census data, I control for the proportion of each
state’s population that is: white, Latino, Urban¸ and has at least a high school population; I also
control for the percentage of each state’s population that is Under 18 and Over 65, as these
populations tend to be particularly reliant on social programs (Garand 2010); finally, I also
control for median household income in the states.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Senators’ roll-call voting will be more conservative when their home states
experience increased rates of immigration.
Hypothesis 2: Senators’ roll-call voting conservatism will not be related to inequality in their
home state.
Hypothesis 3: Senators’ roll-call voting will be more conservative when their home states
experience both increased rates of immigration and increased levels of inequality.
I present the results of my tests of hypotheses one through three below. I find that increased rates
of immigration to a given state are associated with greater roll-call conservatism among
Republicans in that state’s Senatorial delegation, but that there is no relationship between rates of
immigration and Democratic Senators’ roll-call ideology.
Methods

5

Both because the Congress dummies are of no substantive interest and because STATA drops several of them
because of multicollinearity, I do not specify a particular Congress dummy as a baseline variable.
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My dependent variable, first-dimension DW-Nominate scores, is continuous, with potential
values of -1 to 1 measured in thousandths, allowing the use of OLS regression in all of my
models. My data are organized as panels or each Senator’s first-dimension DW-Nominate score
in each Congress in which he served, so I use robust standard errors clustered on each Senator.
Being panel data, a time series analysis Senator as the panel variable and Congress as the time
variable is possible, but the results when running a time series are nearly identical to a standard
OLS regression using clustered standard errors. In the interest of simplicity I report only the nontime series results. Finally, to ease interpretation, I do not report the results of the Congress
dummies.
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Results
Table 5.1: OLS Regression on first-dimension DW-NOMINATE without Party
Model 1
Immigration
.919***
(.318)
Inequality
-1.84
(1.38)
White
.004***
(.001)
Latino
.005
(.004)
High School
.01**
(.005)
Under 18
.007
(.005)
Over 65
-.043***
(.012)
Urban
.0007
(.002)
Income
-.0013***
(.00067)
South
.2***
(.07)
N
2133
R2
.33
Note: *** = p<.01; ** = p<.05; * = p<.1
Results for fixed-effects Congress dummies not shown
The results in table 5.1 suggest that changes in a state’s rate of immigration has an important
effect on Senators’ roll-call conservatism. The coefficient on the immigration variable is positive
and significant at the 99 percent confidence level, indicating that higher rates of immigration to a
state are associated with more conservative roll-call ideology among that state’s Senators. As
model four shows, the effect of immigration is not significant when variables capturing both
inequality and an interaction between inequality and immigration are present. This offers support
for my hypothesis that increases in the rate of immigration will increase Senators’ expected roll-
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call conservatism, but does not support my hypothesis that immigration and inequality will have
a positive interactive effect on roll-call conservatism.
The inequality variable does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, casting
doubt on the theory that increased inequality is associated with increased partisan polarization
(McCarty et al. 2016).
Table 5.2: OLS Regression: First-dimension DW-Nominate with Party
Model 3
.576***
(.136)
Inequality
-.297
(.387)
Inequality *
5.27
---Immigration
(3.58)
Republican
..61***
.61***
(.018)
(.018)
White
.0003
.0003
(.0008)
(.0008)
Latino
.001
.001
(.002)
(.001)
Urban
.0007
.0007
(.001)
(.001)
Percent under 18
.004
..004
(.003)
(.003)
Percent over 65
-.02***
-.02***
(.005)
(.005)
High School
.003
.003
(.002)
(.002)
Income
-.0014*** -.0072***
(.0002)
(.0002)
South
.108***
.108***
(.028)
(.028)
N
2119
2119
R2
.84
.84
Note: *** = p<.01; ** = p<.05; * = p<.1
Results for fixed-effects Congress dummies not shown
Immigration

Model 2
.576***
(.136)
-.297
(.387)
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The results in table 5.2, which includes a dichotomous variable for party, support my
hypotheses. In both models 2 and 3, the immigration variable is positive and significant at the
99-percent confidence level, providing strong support for my hypothesis that increases in the rate
of immigration to a state are associated with greater roll-call conservatism among that state’s
Senators. Moreover, the inequality variable is does not achieve conventional levels of statistical
significance in either of the models, casting doubt on the alternative explanation that increases in
inequality lead to greater partisan polarization. Finally, the interaction of immigration and
inequality does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance, casting further doubt
on McCarty et al.’s (2016) theory that immigration increases inequality, which in turn increases
partisan polarization.
In my sample, the mean DW-NOMINATE first-dimension score is -.007. When all
independent variables are held at their means and the immigration variable is set at its lowest
observed value (-.207), the mean predicted value of the DW-NOMINATE variable is -.14, a 6.65
percent decrease; when the immigration variable is set at its maximum observed value (.424), the
mean predicted value of the DW-NOMINATE variable is .17, an a 8.85 percent increase.6

Immigration at minimum (-.207)

Immigration at maximum (.424)

DW-NOMINATE: -6.65%

DW-NOMINATE: +8.85%

Table 5.3: predicted values of DW-NOMINATE at minimum and maximum observed values of
immigration

6

First dimension DW-NOMINATE scores have a possible range of -1 to 1; therefore, a .17 increase is an 8.85
percent increase. If calculated based on the range of observed DW-NOMINATE scores (-.717 to .973), the predicted
change based on the minimum and maximum observed values of immigration are 7.1 and 10.1 percent, respectively.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tested the effects of immigration and inequality on Senators’ rollcall conservatism, as well as the alternative explanation that inequality leads to greater roll-call
conservatism. My state-level tests show that Senators’ roll-call conservatism is positively related
to increases in their respective states’ rates of immigration, but that there is no similar
relationship between roll-call conservatism and inequality. In addition, I did not find an effect
from the interaction of inequality and immigration on roll-call conservatism. These results cast
doubt on the prevailing theory of polarization, McCarty et al.’s (2016) theory that it results from
immigration increasing population-wide inequality while improving the median voter's position
on the income spectrum. If this were the case, one would expect a positive interaction between
immigration and inequality.
Instead, these results on balance support my argument that higher rates of immigration
lead to greater white conservatism, which in turn drives polarization by increasing Republican
conservatism in the U.S. Senate. Both explanations argue that immigration leads to greater
conservatism, but differ in that McCarty et al. (2016) claim that inequality is the causal factor,
while I argue that it is conservative backlash. The strong results for immigration, coupled with
the insignificance of inequality and the immigration-inequality interaction, are important in that
they help to clarify which causal mechanism is most likely at work: the conservative backlash.
However, it should be noted that when controlling for party, inequality appears to have a greater
effect on Republican roll-call conservatism than immigration, although immigration remains
significant for all Senators. This perhaps provides limited, party-specific support for McCarty et
al.’s theory, but the overall results suggest that the relationship between immigration, income
inequality, and polarization owes to a conservative backlash against increased immigration, not
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immigration’s effects on inequality.
In the next and final chapter, I discuss my findings, ways in which future versions of this
study could be improved, ways in which future research can build upon this study, and the
implications of my findings.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
In 2015, after 40 years of sending increasingly conservative Republican delegations to
Congress—the Republican Party in the 114th Congress was the most conservative since
Reconstruction—Republican voters selected Donald Trump as their presidential nominee, and
eventually sent him to the White House in one of the greatest political upsets in U.S. history
(Lewis et al. 2018). Trump, particularly in the primary campaign, ran on an inflammatory mix of
xenophobic attacks on immigrants and, relative to his primary challengers and previous
Republican presidents, a surprisingly moderate platform on issues like Medicare, Medicaid,
Social Security, and trade. At the same time, the United States was at the height of a third wave
of mass immigration, and the proportion of the population that was foreign born was nearing
historic highs. All the while, the Democratic Party remained ideologically moderate, and was, if
anything, criticized for failing to offer new ideas or candidates (Rucker 2016; Enten and Bacon
2017; Time 2015). What explains this extreme, asymmetric polarization? The success of
Trump’s anti-immigrant platform, coupled with his apparent ability to flout Republican
orthodoxy with impunity is a puzzle of its own, but it suggests, however anecdotally, that
perhaps historically high rates of immigration were fueling ever-increasing Republican
conservatism, and that, by responding to Republicans voters’ apparent unhappiness with the
immigration status quo, Trump was able to assuage those anxieties and move toward the center
on redistributive issues (Enten and Bacon 2017).
This dissertation addresses this puzzle of historically high, asymmetrical partisan
polarization by testing the theory that increased rates of immigration sparked a racial-threat
backlash among Republicans, pushing them to the right, but did not affect Democrats. This
theory, which I developed and explained in Chapter 2, argues that exposure to increased rates of
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immigration should lead to greater conservatism among Republicans by sparking a racial-threat
backlash in response to perceived economic and cultural threat from immigration, unease with
redistributive policy amid growing multiculturalism, and frustration with disequilibrium between
policy and public opinion on immigration. The theory also argues that the Democratic Party’s
ascriptive coalition of minorities and urban whites should be unaffected by increased rates of
immigration.
Throughout, multiple tests of this theory on both the mass public and elites found that
increased rates of immigration are in fact associated with greater Republican conservatism and
antagonism toward Democrats, but that there is no effect from immigration on Democrats. In
Chapter 3, I tested this theory on voters, and found that increased rates of immigration are
associated with greater affective polarization and self-reported ideology among Republicans, but
found no relationship between rates of immigration and Democrats’ affective polarization or
self-reported ideology. In Chapter 4, I tested the theory on state legislators, and found similar
results: increased rates of immigration to a state are associated with greater roll-call conservatism
among that state’s Republican legislators, but there was no relationship between rates of
immigration to a state and Democratic legislators’ roll-call ideology. In chapter 4, I also found a
relationship between higher rates of immigration to a state and a more conservative policy mood
among the citizens of a state. In chapter 5, I tested the relationship between rates of immigration
to a state and Senators’ roll-call ideology, and found that increased rates of immigration to a state
were associated with greater roll-call conservatism among Senators from that state when
controlling for party. Finally, in all of the above cases I tested the alternative theory that
inequality has led to increased Republican conservatism but has not affected Democrats; none of
my tests supported this alternative explanation (McCarty et al. 2016). The consistency of my
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findings across multiple levels of analysis—voters, state legislators, the public in the states, and
Senators—provides strong support for my argument that increased rates of immigration have
contributed to greater asymmetrical polarization.
These findings have several important implications. First, the proportion of the U.S.
population that is foreign born is near its historic high (U.S. Census 2018), but this study found
that it is the rate of change in the foreign-born proportion of a given area, not the absolute
proportion, that affects partisans’ behavior. Given this, if the rate at which immigrants are
coming to the United States continues its current trend of stabilizing, or even decreases, then one
would expect the Republican Party to become more moderate. While beyond the scope of this
study, the most recent DW-NOMINATE data show that the Republican Party in the 114th House
is the first in over 40 years to that was not more conservative than its predecessor (Lewis et al.
2018).7 Given that this coincides with a leveling off of the rate of immigration to the United
States, it suggests that the historically conservative Republican Party may in fact moderate in
coming years should current immigration trends continue, or should the rate of immigration to
the U.S. decline.
On the other hand, it is possible that increased racial and ethnic diversity arising from
immigration, rather than the proportion of the population that is foreign born, is the true
demographic issue driving increased partisan polarization. If this is the case, although the
proportion of the population that is foreign born will likely fall as the members of the current
wave of migration to the United States die, the trend of increasing racial and ethnic diversity will
continue as first generation immigrants have children at higher rates than whites; perhaps more

7

The Republican Party in the 114th House was the first in over 40 years to be more liberal than its predecessor, but
the Republican delegation to the 114th Senate was more conservative than its predecessor. Lewis et al. (2018) find
that the combined Republican delegation to the 114th Congress was more conservative than their predecessors in the
113th Congress.

99

importantly, the diversity of the electorate will increase even more rapidly as those secondgeneration children reach voting age. This raises an important question for future research: as the
source of demographic change in the United States shifts, will foreign-born residents continue to
affect Republican ideology and attitudes, as this study argues, or will demographic change
among the potential electorate become the more important factor?
Importantly, all of these predictions rely on the assumption that the Republican electorate
remains almost uniformly white, which, as the 2012 Republican National Committee “autopsy”
found, would leave the party increasingly unable to compete in national elections as the white
share of the electorate declines (Growth and Opportunity Project 2013). This gives the
Republican Party a strong, if not existential, incentive to diversify its membership and electorate;
should it do so, perhaps the effect of immigration on Republicans will become similar to its
effect on Democrats, which is to say that it would have no effect at all. The rise of Trump has
done nothing to help the Republican Party diversify, but, so long as it appears that demography is
in fact destiny, one would expect a 164-year-old, major United States political party to adapt as
necessary to prevent political extinction.
Finally, exactly how and why Trump was able to make immigration such a salient issue
remains an open question. While I did not test the effects of the political salience of immigration
on partisan polarization, figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that the increase in partisan polarization has
been very stable—the increase in House Republican’s mean conservatism has been almost
liberal, with the exception of the 104th “Republican Revolution” House—but, the political
salience of immigration has varied widely since at least the 1980s:
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Figure 6.1: Immigration as the Nations’ Top Problem (Gallup 2018)
Trump has certainly displayed great skill as a political demagogue, and it is entirely possible that
his focus on immigration simply reflects his political entrepreneurship; nonetheless, future
research should attempt to explain why and how immigration becomes salient at some points and
recedes from the political agenda at others. Moreover, despite the anecdotal evidence that the
rates of partisan polarization do not appear to be associated with changes in the political salience
of immigration, in light of my finding the rates of immigration are associated with partisan
polarization, future research should explore this issue.
Future versions of this study can be improved in several ways. First, much of the
demographic data used here, including measures of the foreign born population, rely on
interpolation between the decennial Censuses. This is defensible on the ground that demographic
trends tend to be stable, but future studies would benefit from collecting annual estimates of
these data in the non-Census years, while retaining the more accurate decennial census data in
Census years. Second, future versions should test my hypotheses about immigration, inequality
and Congressional roll-call ideology in the House (here, I only tested these hypotheses in the
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Senate). Doing so would provide important new insights into this relationship, given that most
House districts are smaller in both population and area than most Senate districts. I chose to test
the hypotheses in the fixed-district Senate to take advantage of the fact that it offers a natural
control for the effects of gerrymandering, but extending these tests to the House would be an
improvement. Finally, while my finding that increased rates of immigration in the states is
associated with a more conservative public “policy mood” in the states does add support to my
argument, this finding is limited, because it does not differentiate between Republicans and
Democrats. Developing a way to account for partisanship in a state—say, presidential vote share,
or estimates of states’ partisanship—would improve this portion of my argument.
This study also provides avenues for new research. Europe offers many comparative
politics possibilities, because many European countries have experienced high rates of
immigration in recent years, now have foreign-born proportions of their populations that are
similar to that of the U.S., and have seen numerous far-right parties perform surprisingly well in
recent elections (Kirk 2016). Of particular interest is the fact that Germany, the United Kingdom,
and France now have similar proportions of their populations that are foreign born, but their farright parties have had considerably different platforms, popularity, and electoral success.
Determining what role, if any, immigration has had on far-right parties in Europe would be an
important contribution to our understanding of the effects of immigration on partisans (BBC
News, 2018).
Finally, this study should be revisited in the coming decades, because, as mentioned
earlier, the rate of immigration to the United States appears to have stabilized in the years
following the Great Recession. As noted above, my theory and findings suggest that stabilization
of the rate of immigration to the United States should correspond to a leveling off of the
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Republican Party’s trend toward increasing conservatism, and, should rates of immigration
decline, the Republican Party should become more ideologically moderate. Whatever the future
trends of immigration to the United States turn out to be, the question of the role of immigration
on the parties’ ideologies and behavior will remain an important one that is deserving of study.
Having begun this project in 2014, it is only slightly hyperbolic to say that it is surreal to write
this conclusion only twenty-one months after Donald Trump took office, and only four months
after his zero-tolerance border policy and resulting separation of migrant children from their
parents consumed the political news cycle. Voters routinely cite immigration as among the most
important problems facing the country, and migrant detentions at the Southern border have
surged in the months since Trump ended the policy of family separation (Miroff and Dawsey
2018). This political scientist is reluctant to prognosticate in the age of Trump, but it feels safe to
say that immigration will remain a controversial and consequential issue going forward. Here, I
have done my best to contribute to the body of knowledge about those consequences, and have
hopefully made a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the effects of immigration on
the parties in the electorate and in government.
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